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Abstract 
 
The objective of my dissertation is to create a general approach to evaluating 
IS/IT projects using Real Option Analysis (ROA). This is an important problem because 
an IT Project Portfolio (ITPP) can represent hundreds of projects, millions of dollars of 
investment and hundreds of thousands of employee hours.  Therefore, any advance in the 
techniques used to manage an ITPP will save a significant amount of limited resources.    
A primary obstacle in using traditional methods to evaluate IS/IT projects is that 
they are notoriously risky.  Cost overruns of 100%, or even outright failure are 
commonplace (Standish Group, 2009).  When project volatility is high metrics such as 
NPV and ROI are of limited value.  The weakness of these measures is that they are point 
estimates of static business environments and do not account for managerial flexibility.  
ROA has been a primary stream of MIS research for the last decade and is a suggested 
approach for evaluating projects in IS management frameworks such as COBIT and Val 
IT.   
There are several known issues that need to be addressed before project portfolios 
can be evaluated using ROA.  Unlike investments in financial portfolios, projects in MIS 
are clearly not independent of each other.  That is, companies invest in particular 
technologies that actively interact and often depend on each other, e.g. Java, Oracle, SAP 
etc.  A second issue is that IS/IT projects and their driving variables can be non-normally 
distributed, non-linearly related, and asymmetrically correlated.  These characteristics, 
especially inter and intra-project interactions between non-normally distributed variables, 
violate the assumptions of the basic Black-Scholes, Binomial, and Margrabe ROA 
models used in the current MIS research. 
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This work suggests using a Monte Carlo approach to calculating option value 
using mathematical copulas. Copulas allow each variable that make up a multivariate 
distribution to be considered separately from the dependence structure between the 
variables.  This work can be seen as a logical next step in the MIS literature, which has 
thus far focused on evaluating individual projects without interactions, and will enable 
practitioners to manage their ITPP as a whole, instead of as individual projects. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction to the Dissertation 
If you can measure that of which you speak and can express it by a 
number, you know something of your subject; but if you cannot measure it, 
your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory."  ~Lord Kelvin 
"If you can't measure it, you can't manage it." ~David Norton 
The valuation and prioritization of IS/IT projects has been a concern in the MIS 
literature for more than twenty years, and is an especially important topic during 
economic uncertainty.  As executives within companies face increasing budgetary 
pressure and as technology becomes more complex and interconnected, firms have begun 
managing their IT projects as a portfolio rather than in isolation (Kersten and Verhoef, 
2003). This is done to better (1) control the organization’s collective IT expenditure, (2) 
to appropriately balance the organization’s risks and returns, and (3) to better account for 
the increasingly dynamic business environment.  Centralized management of IS/IT is also 
a result of recent government regulations, e.g. the Sarbanes Oxley Act, which require 
greater transparency of overall risks within public companies (Zhang, 2005). 
Because a firm’s IS/IT project portfolio can represent hundreds of projects, 
millions of dollars and tens of thousands of employee hours, any advance in managing 
this portfolio represents a significant gain in resources, while any failure can represent 
large losses (Bardhan et al., 2004).  In fact, rarely do the predicted outcomes of MIS 
projects actually hit their target; perhaps as few as one project in three (Standish Group, 
2009)!  For example, 
 Nike’s difficulties in installing supply chain software cost it an estimated US $200 
million dollars. 
 
 Interstate Bakeries’ admittance of a virtual collapse of its financial reporting 
system reduced its market value by one third in a single day. 
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 Failures in IT-enabled logistics systems at MFI and Sainsbury led to multimillion 
GBP write-offs, profit warnings and share price falls. 
 
 An operational meltdown after the Southern Pacific–Union Pacific merger was 
traced largely to the inability to co-ordinate their IT systems. 
 
Given these examples and government mandated changes to how firms’ manage their 
investments, it can be expected that a large amount of resources will be devoted to this 
problem. 
One of the biggest IS/IT challenges for organizations is managing risk.  
Traditional project management uses Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) methods such as Net 
Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) to prioritize investments.  
Unfortunately, NPV does not explicitly measure risk. It is a point estimate that assumes a 
static environment and does not account for interactions between projects.  DCF 
techniques also ignore an organization’s ability to respond to events and therefore 
undervalue projects with high volatility.  Relying on point estimates can also lead to 
approving projects without developing contingency plans in case things go wrong.  This 
can be very costly, 
 
Companies with poor business analysis capability will have three times as 
many project failures as successes.  68% of companies are more likely to 
have a marginal project or outright failure than a success due to the way 
they approach business analysis. In fact, 50% of this group’s projects 
were “runaways” which had any 2 of: taking over 180% of target time to 
deliver; consuming in excess of 160% of estimated budget; or delivering 
under 70% of the target required functionality (ISACA, 2005). 
 
1.1 IS/IT Project Portfolio Management Using Real Option Analysis 
 
Since Markowitz introduced modern portfolio theory in 1952, it has been 
generally recognized that investments should be managed as a portfolio, rather than as 
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independent investments.  The overall strategy is to balance the overall risk vs. return of 
the entire portfolio as informed by the organization’s appetite for risk.  Costs, benefits, 
and risks for IS/IT projects are stochastic in nature, and as illustrated in the examples 
from the Standish Group, estimates of these variables can be inaccurate by 100% or 
more.  
Real Option Analysis (ROA), which is based on distributions rather than point 
estimates, offers greater flexibility in capturing the value inherent in these IS/IT projects.  
For simple investments the standard Black-Scholes model (1973) may suffice, (Benaroch 
and Kaufman, 1999), or for slightly more complicated situations the Margrabe (1978) and 
Binomial models have been used (Bardhan et al., 2004; Don Santos, 1991; Benaroch, 
2002).   
When very complex investments scenarios arise, ROA reasoning can be 
combined with Monte Carlo techniques to calculate portfolio value involving many 
interacting variables.  Monte Carlo simulates possible events using random number 
generation and assumptions about the underlying distributions involved.  This technique 
has the advantage that it uses well understood parameters such as mean, median, mode, 
standard deviation etc., which can be easily and transparently tracked over time, fulfilling 
the requirements of executives, investors and regulators.   
In order to model the portfolio effectively using Monte Carlo, the joint 
distribution of costs and benefits have to be estimated.  However, even relatively simple 
joint distributions are difficult for managers to conceptualize if the number of variables 
involved is beyond two.  That is, if costs and revenues are both normally distributed most 
people can understand the joint distribution, i.e. bivariate normal.  However, if costs are 
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normally distributed, revenues are log-normally distributed and time to completion is 
from a Beta distribution, most people cannot conceptualize the joint relationships.  
Copulas simplify analysis by allowing practitioners to focus on the marginal distributions 
independently of the joint relationships. 
1.2. Real Options Analysis “On”, “In” and “Between” IT Projects 
 
There have been many different kinds of real options identified (Table 1.1.).  One 
way the option literature divides options is into three categories, real options “On”, “In”, 
or “Between” projects (Figure 1.3).  Abandon and defer options are real options “On” 
projects because they apply to the whole project.  The whole project is abandoned or it is 
not. Generally no changes to the design of the project need to be made for these options 
to exist, although some contractual issues may need to be addressed.   
Real options “In” projects generally require some design issues to be addressed 
before they can occur.  For example, if a company plans to build a new Website it can 
choose to host the Website itself which requires hiring staff, buying equipment, training 
employees etc., or it can “Outsource” and hire a third party to host the Website utilizing 
their expertise in security, backups, Web services etc.  However this requires that some 
deeper design issues be addressed, such as where will confidential customer information 
be stored? 
 Real options “Between” projects are conceptually simple.  How will two 
IS/IT projects interact?  A new database project may enhance an existing Website, but at 
high levels of activity it may interfere with Website performance causing customers to 
leave your site. The relationship between ROA “On”, “In” and “Between” projects is 
shown in Figure 1.1. 
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1.3. Using Monte Carlo to Extend Real Option Analysis 
The ROA methodology using Monte Carlo simulation presented in this work 
offers several advantages over DCF methods and extends the traditional ROA in MIS in 
several ways, e.g. the Black-Scholes model.  It allows several simplifying assumptions 
commonly made in ROA analysis to be relaxed, namely that 
 Distributions are Gaussian or Normal 
 Variables are independent 
 Interactions are linear 
 
Since Nelson (2006, 1999), released his work on mathematical copulas, many 
fields have begun to remove these simplifying assumptions, in particular the fields of 
finance, civil engineering, oil exploration, and hydrology.  It should be noted that the 
terminology, ROA “On”, “In” and “Between” projects is common in the fields mentioned 
above, but is not typically used in MIS, where ROA has received relatively less attention 
from researchers.  This situation has created a research opportunity in MIS to adopt 
Monte Carlo techniques (Figure 1.2.). 
 As shown in Figure 1.3, the majority of the work in MIS has focused on the 
Black-Scholes, Binomial and Margrabe option models.  These models were designed for 
evaluating single options, with no interactions between variables and symmetrical 
correlation throughout their distributions.  Chapter 2 of this dissertation will use 
mathematical copulas to explore these issues. 
 Because of the limitations discussed above, these models are also not suited to 
evaluating real options “between” projects, such as growth options.    While some 
research has been done in this area, chapter 3 of this work will show why the methods 
used in the MIS literature so far have introduced a flaw into the valuation process, known 
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as “The Flaw of Averages”, and illustrate how Monte Carlo can be used to solve this 
problem.   
 Finally, when the commonly used models are used to evaluate real options “in” 
projects, there is still a problem of interactions between multiple options.  When more 
than one option exists in a project they are likely to be correlated.  This means that the 
options values will usually be either sub or super-additive in nature.  Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation will explore these issues. 
1.4. Research Goals and General Applicability of this Work 
 
The goals of this dissertation are to (1) present a solution to the problem of 
valuing IS/IT projects involving interactions, (2) allowing management to quantify risks 
and returns using metrics that are transparent and are consistent with common IS/IT 
management frameworks, and (3) that allows for nonlinear, non-normal and 
asymmetrically correlated variables.  The proposed solution to this problem is to use 
Monte Carlo methods using mathematical copulas in ROA. 
 
The contribution of this dissertation to MIS is threefold: 
 
 It introduces the concepts of mathematical copulas, asymmetric correlation, and 
non-linear correlation to the main MIS literature which has just begun to discuss 
these concepts.   
 
 It provides a layered methodology for practitioners so they can use just the 
amount of complexity in their model that is deemed appropriate.  Because all 
models require data for setting them up, the burden for managers is minimized by 
separating ROA “On”, “In” and “Between” analysis. 
 
 It builds on the past MIS literature using ROA in a portfolio setting and provides 
a foundation for future work.  ROA is an active and well accepted stream of 
inquiry within the MIS literature, typically in the context of single projects.  This 
dissertation will provide a foundation for continuing research in ROA “between” 
projects. 
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The structure of the dissertation is divided into three papers.  The first paper 
suggests a method for dealing with interactions on intra-option variables, aka ROA “On” 
projects.  The second paper deals with ROA “Between” Projects.  The third paper deals 
with ROA “In” projects. 
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 1.5 Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Option Description Type 
Defer The option to delay investment until more information can be learned 
about the project, such as costs, prices, demand etc. 
On 
Stage The option to build a project in stages, where investment can be 
delayed or even killed if the environment changes. 
In 
Explore The option to use a pilot program to better learn about a project before 
initiating it on a full-scale basis. 
Between/In 
Scale The option to increase or decrease the scale of a project depending 
upon its success. 
In 
Abandon The option to kill a project if it goes badly. On 
Outsource The option to subcontract a project or part of a project to shift some 
downside risks to a third party. 
In 
Lease The option to lease some resources to shift some downside risks to a 
third party. 
In 
Growth A set of projects where the value of earlier projects depends largely on 
investments in additional projects, i.e. an infrastructure investment that 
assumes follow-on investments will be made using that infrastructure. 
Between 
Compound A combination of the above options in one project.  
Table 1.1.: Common Options Types (Mun, 2002; Trigeorgis, 1996; Dixit and Pindyck, 1995) 
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Figure 1.2: A research opportunity exists in MIS because there is currently no widespread 
model accepted for evaluating IS/IT projects in a ITPP with many interactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
NPV, IRR, ROI etc. 
Black Scholes, 
Binomial, Margrabe 
Models 
No ROA model yet 
accepted in the MIS 
literature, possibly 
Monte Carlo 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: ROA “On”, “In” and “Between” projects, (Wang, 2005) 
Research Trend 
Deterministic Models          Active Management    Centralized Management 
of individual projects          of individual projects         of a portfolio of projects. 
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Figure 1.3: Mind Map of Real Option Analysis in Management Information Systems 
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Chapter 2: Valuing Real Options “On” IS/IT Investment 
Projects Using Copulas 
 
Abstract 
 
Because of high levels of uncertainty inherent in MIS development projects, Real Option 
Analysis (ROA) has become a primary stream in the MIS literature over the last decade.  
Most of this literature has focused on option models borrowed from finance such as the 
Black-Scholes option model, the Binomial option model, and the Margrabe option model.  
These models make several simplifying assumptions regarding the nature of the project’s 
costs, savings/revenues and the correlation between the two, e.g. that the distributions 
are lognormal, the correlation is symmetric, and the relationships are linear.  This paper 
seeks to illustrate the pitfalls of implicitly making these assumptions and provide an 
alternative technique for calculating project value that (1) allows flexibility in modeling 
input/output distributions and (2) allows assumptions about the correlation between 
input/output variables to be relaxed. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The selection and valuation of IS/IT projects has been a concern in the MIS 
literature for more than twenty years.  As the technology projects within firms have 
become more numerous and complex, managers have begun managing the firm’s IS/IT 
projects as a portfolio of investments (Kersten and Verhoef, 2003). This is done to better 
control the organization’s collective IS/IT expenditure, to appropriately balance the 
organization’s risks and returns and to manage the increasingly complex and regulated 
business environment (Zhang, 2005; Markowitz, 1952).   
Because a firm’s IS/IT project portfolio can represent hundreds of projects, 
millions of dollars and tens of thousands of employee hours, any advance in managing 
this portfolio represents a significant gain in resources (Bardhan et al., 2004).  However, 
rarely do the predicted valuations of MIS projects actually hit their target, perhaps as few 
as one project in three! 
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According to the Standish Group's just-released report, "This year's 
results show a marked decrease in project success rates, with 32% of 
all projects succeeding which are delivered on time, on budget, with 
required features and functions" says Jim Johnson, chairman of The 
Standish Group, "44% were challenged which are late, over budget, 
and/or with less than the required features and functions and 24% 
failed which are cancelled prior to completion or delivered and never 
used.  These numbers represent a downtick in the success rates from 
the previous study, as well as a significant increase in the number of 
failures", says Jim Crear, Standish Group CIO, "They are low point in 
the last five study periods. This year's results represent the highest 
failure rate in over a decade" (Standish Group, 2009) 
    
Many traditional financial techniques used in evaluating IS/IT projects, such as 
NPV or ROI, assume static business environments, which is rarely a valid assumption for 
information systems development.  Costs and benefits for IS/IT projects are stochastic in 
nature, and point estimates of these variables are often inaccurate by 100% or more 
(Standish Group, 2009).  Real Option Analysis (ROA), which explicitly accounts for the 
ability of managers to react to events, offers greater efficacy in determining the value of 
risky projects.   
One class of real options is real options “on” projects.  These options are 
extensions of the familiar call and put options from finance where an option can be 
exercised or not depending on the current situation.  These options are typically valued 
using the Black-Scholes or Binomial option models which contain assumptions about the 
nature of the investment that may not be accurate, e.g. costs are fixed. 
An alternative branch of ROA, using Monte Carlo simulation, allows several 
simplifying assumptions to be relaxed, namely that: 
 Distributions are Gaussian or Normal 
 Variables are independent 
 Relationships are linear 
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These assumptions are commonly made for several reasons, e.g. for convenience sake, 
because linear methods are easier to use, and because, until recently, a lack of appropriate 
software tools and computing power.  Today’s more powerful laptops and statistical 
software packages make these compromises unnecessary. 
In order to do ROA with Monte Carlo, the joint distribution of costs, 
revenues/savings, time to maturity etc., of an investment has to be defined. However, 
even relatively simple joint distributions are difficult to conceptualize if the number of 
variables involved is beyond two.  One promising technique, using mathematical copulas, 
allows for multivariate joint distributions to be separated into their marginal and joint 
components (Nelson, 2006, 1999), thus allowing executives to monitor overall costs 
separately from overall benefits or from their joint relationship.  For example, instead of 
trying to find a joint distribution that accurately models the relationship between cost and 
revenue, it would be enough to know that costs are normally distributed, revenues are 
log-normally distributed, and the two have a Spearman’s correlation of 0.6.   
The contribution of this paper to MIS IS threefold: (1) It introduces the concepts 
of mathematical copulas, asymmetric correlation, and non-linear correlation to the main 
MIS literature which has just begun to discuss these concepts.  (2) It provides a 
transparent method for practitioners to evaluate ROA “On” projects, using quantifiable 
metrics that can be tracked over time. (3) It illustrates the pitfalls of blindly adopting the 
traditional ROA models when asymmetric correlation and nonlinear relationships exist. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows:  The next section reviews the related 
literature. Section 2.3 reviews mathematical copulas, a branch of statistics that is not well 
known in MIS despite being well represented in Finance, Economics, and Engineering 
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etc.  Section 2.4 re-examines a case from the literature using the new methodology 
presented in this paper.  Finally, section 2.5 offers concluding remarks and suggestions 
for future work. 
2.2. Related Literature 
2.2.1. Introduction to Real options 
IS/IT projects are traditionally ranked using Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
techniques, such as Net Present Value (NPV).  In order to reflect the uncertain nature of 
technology investments, cash flows must be discounted at extremely high rates resulting 
in the NPVs of IS/IT projects often being negative (Jeffery and Leliveld, 2004).  These 
DCF techniques assume that managers cannot react to changing events and that the 
expected value of a project is certain (AICPA, 1994; Myers, 1984, 1977).   
However, the actual results of an IS/IT project are often very different from the 
expected value and managers do have the flexibility to react to some events.  For 
example, managers can kill a failing project or expand a successful one, thus maximizing 
profits and minimizing losses.  Real option analysis tries to place a value on this 
managerial flexibility.  The value of projects that contain options has been expressed as 
(Trigeorgis, 1996), 
Project Value = Traditional Net Present Value + Value of Managerial Flexibility (1) 
 Other influential works that have shaped ROA include Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
who explored the usefulness of ROA in investments; Amram and Kulatilaka (1999), 
Luehrman (1999),  Copeland and Antikarov (2001), and Boer (2002) who explored the 
various types of options that exist in projects and developed rationales for using option 
theory.  Howell et al. (2001) who present various illustrative case studies that used ROA 
in the decision making process.  Brach (2003) and Rogers (2002) who both focused  on 
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developing the Binomial option model, and finally Mun (2002) who has been an early 
advocate of using Monte Carlo for practitioners 
2.2.2. Real Options in MIS 
Over the last ten years there have been a number of papers in the MIS literature 
on Real Option Analysis.   Much of the early work focused on justifying ROA in IS/IT 
projects and on deferment options (Li and Johnson, 2002; Benaroch and Kaufman, 2000, 
1999; Taudes, Feurstein, and Mild, 2000; Don Santos, 1991).  A major point of these 
early works was that IS/IT projects are fundamentally risky and are thus are undervalued 
when NPV is used.   
As the ROA research in MIS developed, the focus began to explore risk and risk 
management (Schwartz, and Zozaya-Gorostiza, 2003; Benaroch, 2002, 2001), growth 
options (Benaroch et al. 2006; Bardhan et al., 2004), and actively building options into 
projects (Benaroch, 2006, 2002, 2001).  The bulk of this work focused almost exclusively 
on three option models, the Black-Scholes model (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 
1973), the Margrabe model (Margrabe, 1973) and the Binomial model (Cox and 
Rubinstein, 1978).    
The Black-Scholes model, which was the first widely used option model, uses 
stochastic calculus to obtain a value for an investment while assuming costs are fixed.   
The Binomial model simplifies the Black-Scholes calculations by using Binomial trees 
instead of calculus to obtain valuations.  The Binomial model is by far the easiest of the 
commonly used models to understand, but is unwieldy and only approximates the Black-
Scholes model.   The Margrabe model extends the Black-Scholes model, by allowing 
both costs and benefits to vary. 
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2.2.3. Limitations of the Traditional Option Models 
Recently, researchers have begun to question the assumptions embedded in these 
three models and have suggested that there may be significant intra or inter-project 
interactions in IS/IT investments.  Complexity theory suggests that the assumption of 
independence is not generally applicable to real world systems (Anderson, 1999; Carlson 
and Doyle, 1999; Bak, 1997).    Interactions are important because they may be either 
super or sub-additive, thus causing the valuations given by traditional models to be off by 
up to 1,000 percent (Banker et al., 2010; Fichman, 2004; Bardhan et al., 2004; Trigeorgis, 
1993).    
Another important assumption of the Black Scholes and Margrabe formulas 
includes the assumption that revenues follow a log-normal distribution for investment 
returns, e.g. the minimum value is zero, and the maximum value is infinite.  Although 
financial derivatives have a minimum value of zero, projects in IS can have negative 
values and in fact often lose significant amounts of money.   Finally, the Black-Scholes 
and Margrabe models assume that correlation between costs and revenues is symmetric.   
2.3. Copula Models  
2.3.1. Introduction to Copulas 
Copulas are a relatively new statistical tool in business administration. Although 
their origin goes back to Sklar (1959), they remained regulated to mathematicians until 
the arrival of powerful desktop computers and statistical packages such as SAS, R, SPSS, 
etc.  It was not until Nelson’s works (2006, 1999) and Schmidt’s (2006), that copulas 
became accessible to non-mathematicians.  Since that time, copulas have been used in a 
wide range of applications including insurance, hydrology (Salvadori and De Michele, 
2004; Gaume, 2006), the petroleum industry (Armstrong et. al, 2004; de Melo e Silva 
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Accioly and Chiyoshi, 2004), decision analysis (Clemon and Reilly, 1999) and many 
financial applications.  
2.3.2. Advantages and Limitations of Using Copulas 
 Combined with Monte Carlo, copula methods allow researchers to relax 
assumptions of linearity, independence and/or normality based on empirical or theoretical 
considerations.  Essentially copulas separate the dependence structure of the bivariate 
distributions from the marginal distributions.  A copula model can be thought of as, 
Joint Distribution = Marginal Distributions + Copula                                  (2) 
 
That is, joint distributions change when the marginal distributions change or when their 
copula changes, i.e. their dependence structure changes.   
For a two dimensional representation of copulas, see Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4.  In 
three dimensions copulas for bivariate data can be thought of as a cumulative density 
function over a unit cube that can be combined with inverse functions to produce various 
bivariate density distributions (Figure 2.5). 
The advantages of Copula methods when compared to traditional methods are: 
 
 Assumptions of linearity, independence, and normality can be relaxed. 
 
 Marginal distributions are handled separately from their dependence 
structures.  It is easier for managers and researchers alike to visualize each 
marginal distribution separately than a multivariate joint distribution. 
 
 Using modern desktop computing power, copulas can be constructed from 
empirical data and easily perturbed to investigate “what if” questions, e.g. 
what if the correlation between costs and revenues falls from 60% to 40%?  
 
However, while copula methods allow for flexible assumptions regarding joint 
distributions, caveats do exist.  In order to use copula methods effectively,  
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 The joint distribution must be from a relatively stationary process.  If the joint 
distribution is undergoing significant changes, such as what has happened in 
the housing market between 2008 and 2011, copula models will be inaccurate. 
 
 The marginal and joint relationships that are used by a copula model must be 
estimated.  These estimates can be made using historical data, theoretical 
considerations or by subject matter experts (Leuhrman, 1999), the accuracy of 
these estimates determine the predictive power of the model. 
 
 The variables involved must not be beyond the “relevant range”.  Many 
continuous distributions have infinite tails, which does not necessarily fit the 
empirical situation, e.g. if project costs are assumed to follow a log-normal 
distribution the model will allow for infinite project costs, which obviously 
would not be possible in reality.  Copula models often require the marginal 
distributions to be truncated. 
 
 The existence of a copula model does not imply causality between marginal 
distributions; much like correlation does not imply causality. 
 
2.3.3. Sklar’s Theory 
The most important theory regarding copulas is Sklar’s Theory which states:  
“Let H be a joint distribution function with margins F and G.  Then there exists a copula 
C such that for all x,y in R, 
 
H(x,y) = C(F(x), G(y)). 
 
If F and G are continuous, then C is unique; otherwise, C is uniquely determined on 
Range F x Range G.” (Nelson, 2006, pg.21) 
 
The importance of Sklar’s theory is that it reduces the problem of finding a joint 
density function to simply (1) identifying the appropriate marginal density functions and 
(2) linking them through the appropriate Copula function.   
To illustrate, assume that a bank estimates that its costs and revenues for a new 
project will be log-normally distributed (Figures 2.2.a. and 2.2.b).  Although the bankers 
are confident that these marginal distributions will be log-normal, they are not sure what 
the joint distributions will look like, and it is the joint distributions that will determine 
risk and reward.  They decide to join the two marginal distributions using a Normal 
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copula with 0, 0.4, 0.8, and -0.5 correlations (Figures 2.3.a to 2.3.d.).  The result is the 
rather ugly joint distributions shown in Figures 2.3.e. through 2.3.h.   
The advantage of this approach is that practitioners only have to make predictions 
about the relatively tame marginal distributions (Figures 2.2. a. and  2.2. b.) and then 
choose a copula.  In the past executives would have had to estimate the joint distributions 
shown in Figures 2.3.e through 2.3.h. directly, a much more difficult task. 
2.3.4. Archimedean and Normal Copulas 
For bivariate data there is a class of easily constructed functions known as 
Archimedean copulas which can fit many different patterns of tail dependence.  
Archimedean Copulas have the following properties (Figure 2.5.a.) (Ponzo, 2008; 
Nelson, 2006, 1999): 
 For each pair x and y lying in [0,1], C(x,y), generates a number in [0,1].  
 C(x,y) = 0 if either x or y is 0.  
 C(x,1) = x and C(1,y) = y.  
 C(x,y) is increasing in both x and y. 
 Satisfy the general equation C(x,y) = Φ-1(Φ(x) + Φ(y)); 0 < x, y < 1 
 
Three of the most commonly used Archimedean copulas are the Frank, Clayton, 
and Gumbel copulas, which have symmetric (Figure 3.b.), lower tail (Figure 3.a.), and 
upper tail (Figure 5.c.) dependence respectively.  Their chief advantage is that they are 
easy to use while allowing different levels of upper and lower tail dependency.   
Another commonly used copula is the Normal copula which is convenient when 
correlation is symmetric, i.e. no tail dependence, and a specific level of correlation is 
needed in the dependence structure.  Nelson (2006, 1999) lists 22 different classes of 
copula that exhibit a variety of different dependence behavior which are further 
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catalogued in Armstrong (2003).  These copulas are defined by the equations in Table 
2.1. 
2.3.5. Generating Data with Copulas Using Monte Carlo Methods 
Once the appropriate copula family is chosen, the equations can then be used in 
Monte Carlo simulation using the following procedure (Nelson, 2006). 
1. Assume a copula, for example the Clayton copula  
C(u,v) = [u
-θ
 + v
-θ
 -1]
-1/θ 
 
2. Calculate the partial derivative ∂C/∂x and set w = ∂C/∂x  
w = u
-1-θ
 [ u
- θ
 + v
- θ
 - 1 ] 
-1/ θ - 1
  
 
3. Randomly generate two numbers, u and w in [0,1] 
 
4. Solve w = ∂C/∂x for y in terms of u and w.  
v = [ w
- θ
 
/(1+ θ) 
u
-θ
 - u
-θ
 + 1 ] 
-1/ θ  
 
X and Y can then be determined from u and v using the appropriate inverse functions of 
the marginal distributions.  That is, if the marginal distributions are both Normal, then x 
and y can be found by using the function NORMINV() in Excel. 
2.4 Example Case: Yankee 24 
2.4.1. Case Background 
 One case in the MIS literature involving ROA “On” projects is the Yankee 24 
project first presented by Benaroch and Kaufman (1999, 2000) and again in Schwartz and 
Zozaya-Gorostiza (2003).  The reason for using this example is that (1) it is a case well-
known to MIS researchers; (2) it illustrates the problems associated with the traditional 
Black-Scholes, Binomial, and Margrabe real option models often used in the MIS 
literature; and (3) it highlights the advantages of using copula models.  Both papers 
assumed that correlation was linear and symmetric, which may not be true in the real 
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world.  In this paper we examine the economic significance of the assumption of linearity 
and symmetry when the underlying processes are not linear or symmetric. 
The case involves a simple deferment option on a debit services banking network 
that was to be installed in New England.  The window of opportunity for installing the 
network was from January 1987 to January 1991.  In 1987 few customers had debit cards, 
but the market was expected to grow rapidly (Table 2.2).  Implementation cost was 
expected to be $400,000 and revenues would be captured one year after construction 
started.  No revenues were expected to be earned by the network after July 1992, which 
may be unrealistic, but is a common assumption made by practitioners when justifying 
IS/IT investments. Benaroch and Kaufman originally used a variant of the Black-Scholes 
model to calculate the most profitable entry point for Yankee 24 (Table 4).   
Yankee 24’s option was that it could build its network in January 1987, or wait 
until the market grew.  Waiting to invest meant that Yankee 24 would forego the 
revenues expected in the early years, but these were not expected to be large, e.g. just 
$353 in January 1988.  Waiting was risky in that another company could potentially gain 
a first mover advantage, but also made the investment more financially attractive.  The 
calculated NPV of investing immediately was ($76,767), making the investment 
unattractive using traditional analysis methods.  The risk free rate was 0.07%, discount 
rate for DCF analysis was 0.12%, volatility was expected to be 0.5 and the maximum 
time horizon was 5.5 years (Table 2.3.).   
Benaroch and Kaufman (2000, 1999) and Schwartz et al. (2003) calculated the 
Real Option Value of deferring for each time period.  Results from Benaroch and 
Kaufman are given in Table 2.4.  For comparison sake, Monte Carlo simulations were 
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made using the input values in the original paper and the results are shown in columns (5) 
and (6) of Table 2.4.  As expected the values are close.  The differences are due to 
random deviation and the limitations of the numerical techniques used to simulate the 
option models (Brandimarte, 2006, pp. 429 - 446).   
2.4.2. Modeling Revenues and Costs 
 A call option is the right but not the obligation to invest in a project.  The value of 
such an option is: 
Call Value = Max(Benefits -  Costs, 0) 
 
It is assumed that firms will not invest in projects where Benefits – Costs < 0.  There 
have been many option formulas proposed to place a value on such options.  In Benaroch 
and Kaufman (2000, 1999) a variation of the Black-Scholes option model was used, with 
costs fixed at $400,000 and volatility at 0.50.  The Black-Scholes model assumes that 
revenues follow a random walk modeled as a Wiener process with both a fixed and 
random component: 
dSt = r St dt + St σS dWt         (3) 
 
Where  
 
S = the current asset value 
R = risk free rate 
σS = asset volatility 
W = Brownian motion 
 
 Schwartz et al. (2003) used a variation of this model in their paper, i.e. the 
Margrabe model, allowing costs to vary, but again assumed zero correlation between 
Costs and Revenues. 
dCt = r Ct dt + Ct σC dWt         (4) 
 
Where  
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C = the current cost value 
R = risk free rate 
σC = cost volatility 
W = Brownian motion 
 
 The rationale for assuming a Wiener process in the Black-Scholes and Margrabe 
models is that it is assumed prices change continuously over time.  Part of the change is a 
fixed rate of change, represented by r in equations 3 and 4, and part is a random change 
represented by W.  For example, if you buy a house, it may be assumed that on average 
the house price will rise 3% a year, however some years the increase will be much higher 
than 3% and some years it may even be negative.   
As an extension to Benaroch and Kaufman’s Yankee 24 example, the copula 
model used in this paper assumes that the Margrabe model is the correct model; that both 
revenues and costs are volatile and that both follow lognormal marginal distributions.  
This is not necessary, any marginal distributions could be used, but this was done for 
consistency with the original paper.  The simulation was done consistent with the 
methods detailed in Brandimarte (2006, ch.8).   
The assumption of the Margrabe model that costs can change is important because 
when costs are assumed to be fixed, there is a potential for executives to over/undervalue 
a project depending on how costs and revenues are correlated.  In the original Yankee 24 
case costs were assumed to be fixed at $400,000.  This paper asks the question, what 
would happen if the Costs were expected to be $400,000 but could vary based on a risk 
free rate rate r and some level of volatility σC. 
Proposition 2.a.: The Black-Scholes (and Binomial model) will overstate/understate the 
value of IS/IT investments as the Spearman correlation of the Cost and Revenues 
increases (ρ > 0) /decreases (ρ < 0).  
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 As shown in Table 2.5 and Figure 2.6, as the correlation between Costs and 
Revenues increases, the value of the option decreases.  For validation purposes the 
simulated values of the option were compared to the theoretical value calculated using 
the Margrabe formula, equation (5).  The difference between the theoretical and Monte 
Carlo simulated values is due to random chance, and less than 1% of the theoretical value 
in all cases. 
Margrabe Option Value = S * N(d1) – E * N(d2)     (5) 
 
d1 = [ln(S/E) + (σ
2)/2 * (T)] / [σ * T0.5] 
 
d2 = d1  - [σ * T
0.5
] 
 
σ = [σCosts  +  σRevenues + 2 * σCosts * σRevenues * Correlation Coefficient]
0.5
 
 
The correlation listed in equation (5) and in Table 2.5 column (6) refers to the 
correlation between the Brownian motion portion of Costs and Revenues.  Both Cost and 
Revenue are expected to increase deterministically at some rate r, plus or minus some 
random element as per equations (3) and (4).  When the correlation is close to 1.0 the 
random element moves in the same direction for both costs and revenues, when the 
correlation is close to -1.0 the random element moves in opposite directions. 
2.4.3. Estimation of Input Parameters and Calculation 
 One key to the process of ROA, regardless of the model used, is the estimation of 
costs, revenues, volatility, etc.  Luehrman (1998) suggests three possible sources for this 
information, (1) historical data, (2) estimates by experts, and (3) simulation. The values 
used for key parameters depend on many factors, past history, managerial experience, 
theoretical knowledge, etc. (Bacon, 1992).  While the calculation of NPV, ROI, and IRR 
is well understood by most business professionals, ROA is usually a black box.    
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 Does management understand what Brownian motion is?  Do they understand 
how economies/diseconomies of scale will affect the traditional models?  Do they have a 
good feel for correlation between the key parameters of the traditional option models?  
Monte Carlo ROA allows executives to evaluate costs and revenues separately from the 
correlational structure between them.  Unlike in the traditional models where only log-
normal marginal distributions are used, if a manager states that revenues are log-normal 
and costs are normally distributed, this information can be incorporated into the model.   
The great weakness of Monte Carlo ROA is that the calculations take time.  While 
the Black-Scholes formula takes only a few minutes to calculate using a computer, Monte 
Carlo ROA takes hours or potentially several days.  When trading financial options this is 
an important weakness because stock trades happen in seconds, but in real options where 
million dollar projects are being designed over a period of months, the time needed to run 
Monte Carlo ROA is not that significant. 
2.4.4. Skewness of Marginal Distributions 
 As mentioned above, the Revenues and Costs were assumed to follow lognormal 
distributions, a result of the assumptions inherent in the Black-Scholes and Margrabe 
option models.   These distributions are positively skewed with long tails to the left of the 
distribution, i.e. Mean > Median.   
The importance of assuming positively skewed marginal distributions is that as 
skew increases the potential for costs or revenues falling far from the mean also 
increases.  This is often seen in the real world where IS/IT projects can suffer dramatic 
cost overruns, or be spectacular successes, such as when Nike’s supply chain system 
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experienced a $200 million dollar overrun, or when the Apple IPod displaced the Sony 
Walkman as a personal listening device. 
Proposition 2.b.: The Black-Scholes, Binomial and Margrabe model will 
overstate/understate the value of IS/IT investments as the skewness of the marginal 
distributions of Cost and Revenues increase/decrease. 
 
 As can be seen in Table 2.6 and Figure 2.7 as skewness of the Marginal 
distributions increases, the greater the chance that extremely high option values occur, 
column (4).  The original value of this option calculated by Benaroch and Kaufman was 
$123,786 assuming costs were static and the volatility of Revenues was 0.5.  As 
illustrated, skewness can have a dramatic effect on option value which in the example 
ranges as high as $259,646 or as low as $57,658.   
2.4.5. Tail Dependence of Marginal Distributions 
The Black-Scholes model assumes correlation between costs and revenues is zero, 
while the Margrabe model assumes it is symmetric.  However, it is often the case that 
distributions will have some tail dependence.  That is, costs and revenues may be highly 
correlated when costs are low, and less correlated when costs are high or vice versa, 
(Figure 2.1.a. and 2.1. c.).  This situation would happen when economies or diseconomies 
of scale exist.  Copula models allow various forms of tail dependence to be tried, 
traditional models like the Black-Scholes Model do not allow for tail dependence. 
Proposition 2.c.: The Black-Scholes, Binomial and Margrabe model will 
overstate/understate the value of IS/IT investments as the tail dependence of the copula 
joining Cost and Revenues increases/decreases. 
 
 Tail Dependence is often measured by exceedance correlation.  Exceedance 
correlation is defined as: 
Let Xt and Yt be two stationary stochastic processes, the exceedance correlation at level c 
is: 
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ρ+(c) - ρ-(c) where 
 
ρ+(c) = corr (Xt ; Yt |Xt > c; Yt >   c) 
ρ-(c) =  corr (Xt ; Yt |Xt < -c; Yt < -c): 
 
where c is often but not always the median. 
 
 Table 2.7. and Figure 2.8 show the result of Lower Tail dependence on real option 
values.  Lower Tail dependence, shown in Figure 2.1.a., would occur in IS/IT projects 
when there is expected to be economies of scale.  In these situations low levels of activity 
are associated with a relatively high correlation between Costs and Revenues, and high 
levels of activity are associated with lower levels of correlation.  
 The important point to note between Table 2.5. and Table 2.7. is that overall 
correlation is the same in both cases, however in Table 2.5. the data was generated using 
a Normal copula with symmetric correlation and in Table 2.7 it was generated using a 
Clayton copula with asymmetric Lower Tail dependence.  If a project has economies of 
scale or Lower Tail Dependence the traditional models will undervalue the opportunity 
by a considerable amount, up to 20% as shown in column (4).   
The intuition is that when a project goes poorly economies of scale do not occur, 
correlations are high and the traditional models are reasonably accurate.  However, if 
such a project does do well, economies of scale kick in and value should increase.  
Naturally, the situation is reversed when diseconomies of scale exist, as shown in Table 
2.8 and Figure 2.9.  In such cases the traditional models will overestimate project value, 
in this example by 17% when the Margrabe formula gives an answer of 64,552, but 
simulation calculates the value at only $53,573.   
 Finally, the issues listed above compound each other, i.e. if tail dependence is an issue, 
skewness is high, and costs and revenues are highly correlated the traditional models begin to fail 
28 
 
as shown in Table 2.9 and Figure 2.10.  When skewness is very high and there is Lower Tail 
dependence the difference between simulated and calculated values reaches 42% when revenues 
have a volatility of 1.0.   
2.5. Discussion, Recommendations, and Future Work 
2.5.1. Discussion 
 The Monte Carlo experiments used in this paper simulated the Margrabe Option 
Model where both Costs and Revenues were allowed to vary as a function of a Wiener 
process, in the original 1999 paper, costs were fixed.  Additionally, the Clayton, Frank, 
and Gumbel copulas were used to correlate the random portion of the Wiener processes 
giving the correlation between Costs and Revenues non-linear and asymmetric properties.  
The importance of these two properties for asset allocation is assessed by comparing the 
simulated results to those calculated using the Margrabe option formula.  For comparison 
purposes, the Normal copula was also used in the experiment, which approximates the 
Margrabe option formula. 
Appendix A gives example data generated by the Monte Carlo experiments used 
in this paper.  The main points of interest are: 
 There were significant differences between the option values calculated by the 
traditional models and the simulations that had asymmetries. 
 
 The value calculated by Benaroch and Kaufman was always significantly lower 
than that shown by simulation.  This was a result of the original authors assuming 
costs were fixed. 
 
 As the correlations between Costs and Revenues increased the Sharpe Ratio 
decreased.  The Sharpe Ratio is a standard financial measure of Return vs. Risk,  
Sharpe = (Return – Risk Free rate)/(Standard Deviation). 
 
 The Sharpe Ratio was significantly lower for the Clayton and Frank copulas when 
correlation increased.  This indicates that when asymmetries exist, firms are 
getting less return for the risks they are taking than is indicated by traditional 
models. 
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 When Lower Tail Dependence exists, simulating economies of scale using the 
Clayton Copula, the traditional models undervalue the investment as correlation 
increases. 
 
 When Upper Tail Dependence exists, simulating dis-economies of scale using the 
Gumbel Copula, the traditional models overvalue the investment as correlation 
increases. 
 
There data shows there is significant economic implications for firms that ignore 
asymmetric dependence.  Not only do the traditional models under/overvalue 
investments, but they can overstate the reward per unit risk the organization is assuming 
as per the Sharpe Ratio. 
 Interestingly, at least in the Yankee 24 example, the Black-Scholes option still 
predicted the correct length of time to defer the project.  In the case, Yankee 24 was 
trying to determine when to enter the debit card market.  Regardless of which copula was 
used or how much correlation existed, the most valuable entry point remained January 
1990. 
2.5.2. Recommendation for Practitioners 
 Based on the examples given above there are three basic recommendations to 
practitioners.  First, when using traditional ROA models in analysis, such as the Black-
Scholes or Binomial model, the organization should first determine if costs are actually 
fixed and if they are independent of expected revenues.  If costs and revenues are 
positively correlated, the Black-Scholes based models will overstate the value of IS/IT 
projects.  If costs and revenues are negatively correlated, the Black-Scholes and Binomial 
model will understate IS/IT project value. 
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Second, executives should determine if there is likely to be significant tail 
dependence between costs and revenues.  If lower tail dependence exists, traditional 
models will significantly understate project value and worse if upper tail dependence 
exists traditional methods will overstate project value.  In most situations asymmetries 
reduce the Sharpe Ratio, meaning that the firm will take on more risk for less return if 
they use the traditional models. 
Third, projects that have marginal revenue distributions that are highly skewed 
will have much higher valuations than projects that have less skewed revenues. 
Unfortunately, highly skewed distributions lead to situations where the mean expected 
value is much greater than the median expected value.  Executives need to be aware that 
the expected value of the project may be the result of relatively rare but extremely 
profitable events.   
In the selected data in Appendix A, in all cases the first quartile of project value 
was zero and in most cases the median value was also zero!  This means that half of the 
time this project, listed in the original paper as being worth $152,955,000 would actually 
be worth zero!  Also, much of the value for this project is determined by the maximum 
value of the simulation, representing a rare event, in the case of this simulation a 1 in 
10,000 event.  Even in the base case, assuming no asymmetries or correlation, the 
maximum value of the simulation was $698,240,000 which obviously is an outlier that 
greatly affects the project’s expected value.  This property of the Black-Scholes and 
Margrabe option models may explain why executives often claim ROA overvalues 
projects.  Few executives would knowingly include 1 in 10,000 rare event in their project 
plans.  
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Finally, for the same reason it is imperative that executives ruthlessly kill off 
projects that are not going well.  As noted, roughly 50% of the trials produced a project 
that was worthless.  If the project was not killed off, the value of these projects would go 
from zero to negative, greatly diminishing the projects value. 
2.5.3. Future Work 
 The progression of ROA research in MIS continues to be in the direction of risk 
management and portfolios of projects.  In the past this has meant using the traditional 
ROA models to evaluate investment programmes as nested options.  Monte Carlo ROA 
adds to this process because it allows practitioners and researchers to relax assumptions 
about linearity, log-normality and independence of variables.  Future work on this topic 
needs to be done in evaluating project portfolios instead of single projects and also in 
valuing multiple options within one project. Lastly, this paper also ignored the difficult 
problem of parameter estimation, an important problem if precise valuations are needed 
rather than risk assessments. 
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2.7. Tables and Figures 
 
Name Equation Parameter Dependence 
Frank Copula C(x,y) = (-1/θ) ln [1 – (1-e-θx)(1 – e –θy)/(1-eθ)]          θ in (-∞ , ∞) Symmetric 
Tails 
Clayton Copula C(x,y) = [x-θ + y-θ -1]-1/θ θ in [0 , ∞) Lower Tail 
Gumbel Copula C(x,y) = Exp[-( (-ln(x) θ + (-ln(y) θ)1/ θ] θ in (1 , ∞) Upper Tail 
Normal 
Copula 
C(x,y) = ∫∫1/2∏(1-ρ)1/2exp{(- x2 – 2 ρxy + y2)/2(1- ρ2)}dx 
dy 
 
 
Θ in [1 , 1] Symmetric 
and 
Elliptical 
Tails 
Table 2.1: Common copulas and their formulas (Armstrong, 2003) 
 
 
 
Date Transaction 
Volume 
Operational 
Revenues 
Operational 
Costs 
Net 
Revenues 
Investment 
Cost 
Cash 
Flows 
Jan. 
87 
0 $0 $0 $0 $400,000 ($400,00
0) 
July 
87 
0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Jan. 
88 
3,352 $353 $20,000 ($19,647) $0 ($19,647) 
July 
88 
8,606 $861 $20,000 ($19,139) $0 ($19,139) 
Jan. 
89 
20,969 $2,097 $20,000 ($17,903) $0 ($17,903) 
July 
89 
51,088 $5,109 $20,000 ($14,891) $0 ($14,891) 
Jan. 
90 
124,470 $12,447 $20,000 ($7,553) $0 ($7,553) 
July 
90 
303,258 $30,326 $20,000 $10,326 $0 $10,326 
Jan. 
91 
738,857 $73,886 $20,000 $53,886 $0 $53,886 
July 
91 
1,800,149 $180,015 $20,000 $160,015 $0 $160,015 
Jan. 
92 
4,385,877 $438,588 $20,000 $418,588 $0 $418,588 
Table 2.2: Yankee 24 expected costs and revenues  
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Risk Free Rate  0.05 Discount Rate 0.12% 
Revenue Volatility 50% Time horizon 0 to 5.5 years 
Cost Volatility 0.0 NPV ($76,767) 
Table 2.3: Yankee 24 Project Characteristics in Benaroch and Kaufman (1999) 
 
 
 
Investment 
Date (1) 
Combined 
Discounted 
Revenue (2) 
Discounted 
Cost (3) 
NPV If 
Investment 
Made This 
Period (4) 
Option Value 
If Investment 
Made This 
Period (5) 
Monte 
Carlo 
Calculated 
Value (6) 
Jan. 87 $323,233 $400,000 ($76,767) $65,300 NA 
July 87 $342,216 $393,179 ($50,963) $32,024 $32,020 
Jan. 88 $360,083 $386,473 ($26,391) $66,093 $66,086 
July 88 $376,230 $379,883 ($3,652) $96,830 $96,820 
Jan. 89 $389,207 $373,404 $15,803 $123,786 $123,776 
July 89 $395,566 $367,036 $28,530 $144,565 $144,554 
Jan. 90 $387,166 $360,777 $26,389 $152,955 $152,946 
July 90 $344,813 $354,625 ($9,812) $134,873 $134,868 
Jan. 91 $223,295 $348,577 ($125,281) $65,300 $65,300 
Table 2.4: Black Scholes Calculated Values 
 
 
 
Year Target 
Spearman 
Correlation 
 Copula      
      (1) 
Calculated 
Margrabe 
Value 
       
      (2) 
Simulated 
Value 
 
        
     (3) 
Difference 
(3) – (2) 
 
     
    (4) 
Simulated 
Spearman 
Correlation 
    Copula 
      (5) 
Simulated 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Marginals 
      (6) 
Jan89 -1 200,027 200,870 843 (1.0000000) (0.611966) 
Jan89 -0.5 176,046 177,053 1,007 (0.4828954) (0.342539) 
Jan89 0 145,759 146,225 466 (0.0008267) (0.000096) 
Jan89 0.2 130,911 130,613 (298) 0.1890577 0.160804 
Jan89 0.4 113,633 114,317 683 0.3853154 0.340808 
Jan89 0.6 92,621 93,285 664 0.5815205 0.535134 
Jan89 0.8 64,552 64,608 56 0.7896305 0.761234 
Jan89 1 - - - 1.0000000 1.000000 
Table 2.5.: Selected data for investment deferred for two years at various levels of Spearman 
Correlation.  σCost = 0.5 , σRevenues = 0.5,  Expected Cost = $400,000 , Expected Revenue = 
$389,207 , comparing the theoretical calculated value (2) with the simulated value (3) using a 
Normal Copula.  Number of runs = 100,000 each. 
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Year Sigma 
Revenue 
       
    (1) 
Sigma 
Costs 
 
  (2) 
Calculated 
Margrabe 
Value 
      (3) 
Simulated 
Value 
 
       (4) 
Difference 
(3) – (2) 
 
    (5) 
Skew  
Revenues 
 
      (6) 
Skew 
Costs 
 
      (7) 
Jan89 0.2 0.2 57,300 57,658 358 0.8692 0.8878 
Jan89 0.4 0.4 117,331 116,714 (617) 1.9553 1.9236 
Jan89 0.5 0.5 145,759 146,225 466 2.7089 2.8334 
Jan89 0.6 0.6 172,806 172,928 123 3.9552 3.8283 
Jan89 0.8 0.8 222,036 220,518 (1,518) 6.1315 5.8512 
Jan89 1.0 1.0 264,013 259,646 (4,367) 8.7913 8.1277 
Jan89 0.2 1.0 203,443 202,763 (680) 0.8713 9.4219 
Jan89 0.4 1.0 213,120 212,905 (215) 2.0097 8.7912 
Jan89 0.5 1.0 219,872 219,392 (480) 2.7096 8.5991 
Jan89 0.6 1.0 227,608 228,117 509 3.9049 8.4255 
Jan89 0.8 1.0 245,127 243,325 (1,802) 5.8731 8.9783 
Jan89 1.0 1.0 264,013 259,646 (4,367) 8.7913 8.1277 
Table 2.6.: Selected data for investment deferred for two years comparing various amounts of 
skewness in the marginal distributions.   
 
Expected Cost = $400,000 , Expected Revenue = $389,207.  Spearman Correlation = 0, 
Number of runs = 100,000 each. 
 
 
 
 
Year Target 
Spearman 
Correlation 
 
(1) 
Incorrect 
Calculated 
Margrabe 
Value 
(2) 
Simulated 
Value 
 
 
(3) 
Difference 
(3) – (2) 
 
 
(4) 
Simulated 
Spearman 
Correlation 
 
(5) 
Exceedance 
Correlation 
 
 
(6) 
Jan89 -1 200,027 198,980 1,047 -1 0.5064 
Jan89 -0.5 176,046 172,598 3,448 -0.46612 0.5064 
Jan89 0 145,759 146,648 (889) 0.001399 -0.0032 
Jan89 0.2 130,911 134,136 (3,224) 0.184244 -0.1935 
Jan89 0.4 113,633 120,107 (6,474) 0.382479 -0.3530 
Jan89 0.6 92,621 104,591 (11,970) 0.574684 -0.5029 
Jan89 0.8 64,552 81,483 (16,932) 0.778044 -0.5964 
Jan89 1 - 6,577 - 0.999806 -0.0255 
Table 2.7.: Clayton Copula:  The Margrabe option model under values the investment when costs and 
revenues are highly correlated 
 
Selected data for investment deferred for two years at various levels of Spearman Correlation.  σCost = 0.5 
, σRevenues = 0.5,  Expected Cost = $400,000 , Expected Revenue = $389,207 , comparing the now 
INCORRECT calculated value (2) with the simulated value (3) using a Clayton Copula.  Number of runs 
= 100,000 each. 
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Year Target 
Spearman 
Correlation 
       
  (1) 
Incorrect 
Calculated 
Margrabe Value 
     
  (2) 
Simulated 
Value 
 
      
    (3) 
Difference 
(3) – (2) 
 
     
   (4) 
Simulated 
Spearman 
Correlation 
       
    (5) 
Exceedance 
Correlation 
      
 
    (6) 
Jan 89 0 145,759          144,528        1,231  0.004521 -0.0059 
Jan 89 0.2    130,911           125,993             4,919  0.194788 0.2468 
Jan 89 0.4            113,633           104,448             9,185  0.383257 0.3560 
Jan 89 0.6  92,621             80,757           11,864  0.572246 0.4326 
Jan 89 0.8  64,552             53,573           10,979  0.778408 0.3779 
Table 2.8.: Gumbel Copula:   
 
Selected data for investment deferred for two years at various levels of Spearman Correlation.  σCost = 0.5 , σRevenues = 
0.5,  Expected Cost = $400,000 , Expected Revenue = $389,207 , comparing the now INCORRECT calculated value (2) 
with the simulated value (3) using a Gumbel Copula.  Number of runs = 100,000 each. 
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Year Target 
Spearman 
Correlation 
       
  (1) 
Incorrect 
Calculated 
Margrabe 
Value 
      (2) 
Simulated 
Value 
 
      
    (3) 
Difference 
(3) – (2) 
 
     
   (4) 
Skewness of 
Revenues 
       
     
(5) 
Exceedance 
Correlation 
      
      
    (6) 
Jan89 -1 327,144 331,763 (4,619) 8.8303 - 
Jan89 -0.5 302,141 298,454 3,687 9.6028 0.4456 
Jan89 0 264,013 266,552 (2,539) 9.4558 0.0047 
Jan89 0.2 242,794 252,796 (10,002) 8.7220 -0.1611 
Jan89 0.4 216,171 238,103 (21,932) 8.8094 -0.3071 
Jan89 0.6 181,254 217,407 (36,153) 8.8624 -0.4324 
Jan89 0.8 130,911 186,824 (55,913) 8.6742 -0.5976 
Jan89 1 - 28,571 (28,571) 8.8303 -0.1966 
Table 2.9.: Clayton Copula:   
 
Selected data for investment deferred for two years at various levels of Spearman Correlation.  σCost = 1 , σRevenues = 1,  
Expected Cost = $400,000 , Expected Revenue = $389,207 , comparing the now INCORRECT calculated value (2) with 
the simulated value (3) using a Clayton Copula.  Number of runs = 100,000 each. 
  
 
 
 
Year Target 
Spearman 
Correlation 
       
        (1) 
Calculated 
Margrabe 
Value 
       
      (2) 
Simulated 
Value 
 
      
    (3) 
First Quartile 
 
 
    
      (4) 
Median Value 
       
 
     
       (5) 
Third 
Quartile 
      
 
       (6) 
Jan89 -1 200,027 200,870 - 3,306 296,133 
Jan89 -0.5 176,046 177,053 - 2,225 247,643 
Jan89 0 145,759 146,225 - 817 192,801 
Jan89 0.2 130,911 130,613 - 1,017 169,800 
Jan89 0.4 113,633 114,317 - 615 144,874 
Jan89 0.6 92,621 93,285 - 490 115,161 
Jan89 0.8 64,552 64,608 - 144 77,466 
Jan89 1 - - - - - 
Table 2.10.: Selected data for investment deferred for two years at various levels of Spearman Correlation.  σCost = 0.5 
, σRevenues = 0.5,  Expected Cost = $400,000 , Expected Revenue = $389,207 , comparing the theoretical calculated value 
(2) with the simulated value (3) using a Normal Copula.  Number of runs = 100,000 each.  
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. 
Figure 2.1. a. Bivariate Normal distribution, with 0.60 rank correlated marginals and lower 
tail dependence 
 
Figure 2.1. b. Bivariate Normal distribution, with 0.60 rank correlated marginals and no tail 
dependence 
 
Figure 2.1. c. Bivariate Normal distribution, with 0.60 rank correlated marginals and Upper 
Tail Dependence 
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Dependence Structure Resulting Joint Distribution 
  
2.3. a. Normal Copula for Independent 
Marginals,  cor = 0 
2.3. e. Result of marginals combined with 
copula 
Figure 2.3:  The two Lognormal marginal distributions in Figure 2.2.a. and 2.2.b. have been 
combined using Normal Copulas of different correlations,  shown in Figures 5. a. through 5. 
d. 
 
The resulting joint distributions are shown next to their corrosponding copulas in Figures 
2.3. e. through 2.3. h.  The important thing to note is that in every case only the Copula has 
changed.  The marginal distributions were the same in every case. 
 
 
 
  
2.2. a. Marginal Distribution of Costs 2.2. b. Marginal Distribution of Revenues 
Figure 2.2: The two marginal distributions above can be combined using many different 
copula functions, resulting in different joint distributions. 
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Dependence Structure Resulting Joint Distribution 
  
2.3 b. Normal Copula for Independent 
Marginals,   cor = 0.4 
2.3. f. Result of marginals combined with 
copula 
 
 
 
Dependence Structure Resulting Joint Distribution 
  
2.3. c. Normal Copula for Independent 
Marginals,       cor = 0.8 
2.3. g. Result of marginals combined with 
copula 
Figure 2.3, continued 
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Dependence Structure Resulting Joint Distribution 
  
2.3. d. Normal Copula for Independent 
Marginals,   cor = - 0.5 
2.3. h. Result of marginals combined with 
copula 
Figure 2.3, continued 
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Figure 2.4: Relationship of Marginal and Joint Distributions.  In this case, both the 
Marginal distributions are assumed to be lognormal.  The resulting joint distribution has 
most of its density in the lower left corner, with some outliers far beyond what would be 
expected if the distributions were normally distributed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
  
Figure 2.5. a.  Normal Copula b. Transformed into a bivariate normal 
density function. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: As correlation increases between costs and revenues the value of options 
decrease. 
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Figure 2.7: As skewness of Revenues and Costs increase, option value increases. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: When Revenues and Costs have Lower/Upper Tail Dependence, the traditional 
Margrabe formula under/over values option values. 
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Figure 2.9: When Revenues and Costs have Lower Tail Dependence and high skewness the 
traditional Margrabe formula greatly under values options especially when correlation is 
high. 
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Chapter 3: Valuing Real Options “Between” IS/IT 
Investment Projects Using Copulas 
 
Abstract 
 
Because of the high level of risk inherent in IS/IT projects, Real Option Analysis (ROA) 
has become a major research stream in the MIS literature over the last ten years.  One of 
the reasons for its popularity is that traditional Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) techniques 
are often unable to explain investments in expensive IS/IT infrastructure projects which 
on the surface often have negative Net Present Values (NPV).  Such development projects 
are often done in order to pave the way for future IS/IT investments, e.g. growth options.  
In theory, the initial project should include the benefits from the future projects when 
being evaluated, making a seemingly negative NPV project potentially attractive.  The 
goal of this paper is to derive a more accurate model for placing a value on these IS/IT 
investment programmes using ROA and copulas. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The selection and valuation of projects has been an active research stream for 
over a decade.  In part this has been a response to the increasingly complex array of 
technologies available to organizations, the increasing budgetary pressure on 
management, and an increasingly complex regulation environment, e.g. Sarbanes Oxley.  
Popular management frameworks for IS/IT, e.g. COBIT and VALIT, now require firms 
to centralize the oversight of their technology investments and manage their projects as a 
portfolio (Zhang, 2005; Kersten and Verhoef, 2003; Markowitz, 1952).   
 The difficulty of evaluating an IS/ IT investment is largely due to the high 
volatilities involved.  Traditional DCF techniques involve calculating the expected value 
of a project, but when project volatility is high, a point estimate like the mean can be 
misleading. It is not uncommon for an IS/IT investment to be over budget by more than 
100% (ISACA, 2005).  Real Option Analysis (ROA) is one recommended way to 
evaluate these types of highly volatile investments (VAL IT). 
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A common investment dilemma within organizations is the evaluation of an IS/IT 
project development programme.  Often these situations involve the installation of an 
infrastructure project that once built will allow the organization to build future projects as 
growth options, or real options “between” projects.  These project chains or nested 
options in theory should be evaluated together rather than individually because these 
growth options may change a negative NPV infrastructure project into a positive NPV 
investment (Luehrman, 1998).   
Exactly how the value of these development programmes should be calculated has 
been a point of debate within the MIS community.  Generally it is accepted that the last 
project in the chain should be evaluated first and the benefit it produces should be added 
in some way to the penultimate project. The value of the penultimate project should then 
be calculated and added to the antepenultimate project etc. working backwards until the 
initial project is reached (Benaroch et. al, 2005; Dai et. al., 2005; Bardhan et al., 2004; 
Rogers, 2002; Taudes et al., 2000; Luehrman, 1998). 
A practical issue is what ROA model should be used to solve growth option 
calculations?  The Black-Scholes and related models are very attractive because they 
involve a formula that can be solved in a few minutes.  The Binomial model is easy to 
understand and is very visual, which makes it another popular choice for practitioners.   
However, the Binomial model is only an approximation of the Black-Scholes 
model and its accuracy depends on how many steps are involved in the Binomial tree.  
The Black-Scholes model while being easier to use is often a black-box to practitioners.  
Fisher Black, one of the authors of the model has been quoted as saying that for many 
problems no closed form solutions exist, and even if they do exist it is a waste of time 
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searching for them when computers can find the solutions through numerical techniques, 
like Monte Carlo ROA (Herbst, 2002). 
The goal of this paper is to present a technique that allows such chains of nested 
options to be evaluated appropriately while relaxing several simplifying assumptions that 
have been common in the MIS literature, namely: 
 Independence between projects. 
 Linear correlation between projects. 
 Symmetric correlation between projects. 
 
The method presented utilizes Monte Carlo ROA using mathematical copulas to simulate 
different correlation structures between projects.   
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows; first the related literature is examined, 
second mathematical copulas are reviewed, third the issues inherent in these types of 
problems are illustrated with a case from the literature, fourth copula methods are used in 
order to illustrate the danger of ignoring correlations between projects, finally 
conclusions, recommendations for practitioners and opportunities for future research is 
given. 
3.2. Related Literature 
ROA analysis techniques are designed for situations when both project volatility 
and managerial freedom is high.   DCF techniques are inappropriate in such environments 
because they assume the business situation is static and will not be changed (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994).  There are several different streams within the ROA literature. 
ROA “On” projects focuses on single options within a single project, such as 
abandonment or deferment options.   ROA “In” projects focuses on multiple options on a 
single project especially if the options will interact.  It has long been noted that intra-
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project options can be additive, sub-additive or super-additive.  For example, deferment 
options and abandonment options are sub-additive because there is no reason to defer a 
project if it can be abandoned later at little cost.  Alternatively, expansion options and 
abandonment options can be super-additive because abandonment options allow 
expansion with less risk (Copeland, and Antikarov 2001; Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999, 
Kulatilaka, 1995; Trigeorgis, 1993).   
The subject of this paper is ROA “Between” projects, including nested growth 
options.  The value of growth options may be significant and often exceeds the NPV of 
the initial project in the option chain.  For example, a new high speed LAN may by itself 
generate no income, but the future IS systems a high speed network enables may be quite 
valuable.  Many papers in the MIS literature have addressed different aspects of this issue 
(Kauffman and Kumar, 2007; Benaroch et al., 2006; Dai and Kaufman, 2005; Bardhan et 
al., 2004; Fichman et al., 2004, Brach, 2003 ; Mun 2002; Hurry, Miller, and Bowman, 
1992; Kester, 1984).   
Within the MIS literature there has been some work regarding the proper method 
to value nested option chains.  Benaroch et al. (2006) suggests using the Binomial option 
model despite the model being unwieldy.  Bardhan et al. (2004) used a variation of the 
Margrabe model to value option chains of growth options.  The limitations of these 
models are that they have limited ability to deal with interactions between projects.  In 
the case of growth options, if the initial project goes well/poorly, it is logical to assume 
that the follow-on projects should have a better/worse chance to succeed.   For example, 
if the new high-speed LAN does not work well, a new Web site attached to it is more 
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likely to suffer problems.  How to capture this using traditional option models is not easy 
to answer, but it can be done using simulation. 
  A relatively new method to MIS, Monte Carlo ROA, is an alternative stochastic 
tool that can be used to evaluate investment programmes. Monte Carlo simulation is a 
methodology that attempts to simulate real life situations using approximate statistical 
distributions.  The Black Scholes, Margrabe and Binomial models can all be 
approximated using this method, and many of their limitations can be avoided.  In this 
paper Monte Carlo ROA is used in combination with mathematical copulas to extend the 
MIS literature. 
3.3. Introduction to Copulas 
When using Monte Carlo simulation it is important to correctly represent the joint 
distribution of the phenomena in question.  Until recently this was difficult because it is 
rare for a natural process to neatly follow a well-known multivariate distribution.  Copula 
methods have greatly eased the difficulty of fitting these distributions by breaking them 
up into their marginal and correlational components.  The marginal distributions can be 
any distributions that fit the data, such as Normal, Beta, Poisson, etc. The dependence 
structure, or copula, that connects the marginals is represented over a unit cube using 
scale invariant measures such as Spearman’s rho or Kendall’s Tau.   
Spearman’s correlation and Kendall’s Tau are measures of correlation but unlike 
Pearson Correlation they are not affected by transformations. These metrics remain the 
same no matter which marginal distributions are connected by the copula.  This is 
convenient when different business scenarios need to be explored. All that is required to 
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change the scenario is to attach a new marginal distribution; the dependence structure 
remains unchanged greatly simplifying the Monte Carlo experiments. 
Conceptually copula methods can be thought of as being similar in function to 
linear regression, but in a form that allows non-linear and multi-dimensional relationships 
to be explored.  One way to conceptualize a copula function is: 
Joint Distribution = Marginal Distributions + Copula       (1) 
                            
3.3.1. Sklar’s Theory 
 “Copulas are functions that join multivariate distribution functions to their one-
dimensional marginal distribution functions” (p. 5, Nelsen, 1999).   
The relationship between Joint and Marginal distributions is known formally as Sklar’s 
theory,  
“Let H be a joint distribution function with margins F and G.  Then there exists a copula 
C such that for all x,y in R, 
 
H(x,y) = C(F(x), G(y)). 
 
If F and G are continuous, then C is unique; otherwise, C is uniquely determined on 
Range F x Range G.” (Nelson, 2006, pg.21; Ponzo, 2008) 
3.3.2. Archimedean and Normal Copulas 
Sklar’s theory applies to multivariate distributions of any number of dimensions, 
but in practice bivariate copulas are the most commonly used.  One family of copulas is 
called the Archimedean copulas, namely the Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel.  These are 
useful when the joint distribution needed has various amounts of tail dependence.  
Another well-known copula is the Normal copula, which is best used when the joint 
distribution needed has symmetric correlation. 
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  The definitions of these copulas are given in Table 3.1 and their density 
functions and contour plots are shown in Figure 3.1.  Additionally, Nelson (2006, 1999) 
and Armstrong (2003) detail 22 different copulas that can be used to join marginal 
distributions and it is possible for powerful statistical programs to create unique copulas 
from empirical data.   
In this paper copulas are used to link three different projects together, so that their 
revenue streams are correlated.  The Clayton copula is used when two projects are more 
correlated at lower levels of activity, the Gumbel copula is used when two projects are 
more correlated at higher levels of activity, and the Normal copula is used as a base case, 
when two projects are related by a bivariate normal distribution.    
3.4. Placing a Value on a Project with Growth Options 
 There are two proposed solutions that have been examined in the main MIS 
literature for valuing a nested chain of growth options, both based on the Black-Scholes 
formula.  The first, proposed by Bardhan et al., (equation 3), suggested adding the 
expected value of future growth options Ci+1 to the asset value of the initial investment 
Vi.  This raises the potential value of the investment, which may in isolation have a 
negative NPV.   The problem with this approach, identified by Benaroch et al. (2006), is 
that the Black-Scholes model assumes that revenues follow a random walk modeled as a 
Wiener process with both a fixed and random component: 
 
dVt = r Vt dt + Vt σS dWt         (2) 
 
Where  
 
V = the current asset value 
r = risk free rate 
σv = asset volatility 
56 
 
W = Brownian motion 
 
By adding the expected value of future growth options to the initial asset value, (Vi + 
Ci+1), Bardhan et al. are implicitly assuming that the initial investment and its growth 
options are subject to the same risks and risk free growth rate. 
 As an alternative, (equation 4), Benaroch et al. proposes subtracting the expected 
value of future options from the cost of the initial investment, (Ii-Ci+1).  Since costs 
are static in the Black-Scholes model, the added value of the future growth options are 
simply discounted back to the present with no issues of a Wiener process or Brownian 
motion affecting their value. 
 
Where   
 
Ci       = Expected value of call option i 
Ci+1   = Expected value of call option i + 1 
Vi       = Expected value of benefits from investment i 
Ii  = Expected cost of investment i 
N(d1i) = The cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution 
 
 Benaroch et al. constructed nine scenarios to test the accuracy of equations (3) 
and (4) using the Binomial option model as the “gold standard” for accuracy.  Each 
scenario is a combination of three nested projects, an initial investment followed by two 
growth options.  It is appropriate to value the investment programmes starting with the 
third project and working backwards because the value of these future opportunities 
effects the decision about investing in the initial project. The scenarios and the calculated 
Bardhan et al., 
(2004) 
Ci = (Vi + Ci+1) N(d1,i) – e
-rt 
Ii N(d2,i)  (3) 
Benaroch et al., 
(2006) 
 
Ci = (Vi) N(d1,i) – e
-rt 
(Ii-Ci+1)N(d2,i)   (4) 
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results are listed in Table 3.2.  As shown, the approach using equation (3) consistently 
gives a higher value for the option chain than the approach using equation (4). 
 However, there are several issues with the approaches used by Benaroch et al. and 
Bardhan et al.  The first issue is that they both assume that the mean expected value of 
the later options should be added to the benefit, or subtracted from the cost, of earlier 
options in the option chain for evaluation purposes.  The reason why this is problematic is 
because of Jensen’s inequality, also known as the “Flaw of Averages.”  In this case, “the 
gold standard” for accuracy may be very inaccurate. 
3.4.1. The Flaw of Averages 
The Flaw of Averages states that the expected value of a function of X, is not 
equal to the function of the expected value of X except for linear transformations, or 
more formally,  
E[f(x)] ≠ f(E[x]) when f(x) is not a linear function of X. 
 
Non-linear example: 
 
f(x) = x
2
,  X is in {1, 2, 3} with equal probability 
 
E[f(x)] = (1 + 4 + 9)/3 = 4.67 
 
f(E[x]) = f(2) = 4 
 
Linear example: 
 
f(x) = 2x,  X is in {1, 2, 3} with equal probability 
 
E[f(x)] = (2 + 4 + 6)/3 = 4 
 
f(E[x]) = f(2) = 4 
 
One non-technical example of the Flaw of Averages is the joke, “How did the statistician 
drown?  He crossed a river on average only 3 feet deep.”   
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 The Flaw of Averages is relevant to calculating the value of nested option chains 
because the Black-Scholes, Margrabe and Binomial models are not linear models.  By 
adding the expected value of the last option in an option chain to earlier investments it is 
implicitly assumed that the mean expected value of the growth option is the same as the 
median expected value, this is not the case.  The Black-Scholes equation follows a log-
normal distribution, i.e. the mean value of the option is greater than the median.  More 
simply, there will be a few rare cases when the option value will be very high, but many 
times the growth option will be worth zero.  This is easier to understand visually.   
Figure 3.2 shows a Binomial option tree originally from Benaroch et al (2006).  
Using the Benaroch method, the expected value of the numbers on the extreme right of 
the tree is found and eventually subtracted from the penultimate project’s costs.  
However, these numbers 157.7, 53.5, 0, 0 are not linearly distributed.   The mean of the 
four numbers is $52.8 but the median is only $26.75.  If the growth option was built 
100,000 times half the time it would be worth less than $26.75, and often $0, but the 
Benaroch and Bardhan models treat the option as always being worth $26.75.  In reality, 
most of the value is concentrated in 25% of the cases.  The concentration of value in 
relatively few cases means that often the growth option is worth nothing, but when the 
project goes well it adds a lot of value to the option program. 
3.4.2. Monte Carlo Experiments 
  The nine scenarios listed in Table 3.2 were repeated using Monte Carlo 
simulation.  Each experiment involved three projects built in series.  To check what the 
calculated value of the nine scenarios should be two Monte Carlo experiments were run 
that approximated the approach used by Benaroch et al. (2006), i.e. approximating the 
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Black-Scholes formula consistent with Brandimarte’s numerical solution to the Black-
Scholes model (Brandimarte, 2006, Ch.8.) 
First Experiment 
 The first experiment was done using the following steps. 
 
Step 1:  100,000 simulated trials for project 3 were generated assuming each 
simulated result came from a Wiener process as described in equation (2).  The mean of 
these simulated results was calculated and the result was subtracted from the cost of 
project 2, consistent with the logic in equation (4).   
 
Step 2:  100,000 simulated trials for project 2 were generated assuming each 
simulated result came from a Wiener process as described in equation (2).  The mean of 
these simulated results was calculated and the result was subtracted from the cost of 
project 1, consistent with the logic in equation (4).   
 
Step 3:  100,000 simulated trials for project 1 were generated assuming each 
simulated result came from a Wiener process as described in equation (2).  The mean of 
these simulated results was calculated and the result was the value of the option chain. 
 
Scenario Value =  Mean(100k simulated Trials Benefits Project 1 – Cost Project 1   
+    Mean(100k simulated Trials Benefits Project 2 – Cost Project 2 
+    Mean(100k Simulated Trials Benefits Project 3 – Cost Project 3))) 
 
Second Experiment 
 The second experiment was done using the following steps. 
 
Step 1:  1 simulated trial for project 3 was generated assuming the result came 
from a Wiener process as described in equation (2).  The result was subtracted from the 
cost of project 2, consistent with the logic in equation (4).   
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Step 2:  1 simulated trial for project 2 was generated assuming the result came 
from a Wiener process as described in equation (2).  The result was subtracted from the 
cost of project 1, consistent with the logic in equation (4).   
Step 3:  1 simulated trial for project 1 was generated assuming the result came 
from a Wiener process as described in equation (2).   
 
Step 4:  The above steps were repeated 100,000 times and the mean was calculated 
and the result was the value of the option chain. 
 
Value of Scenario =        Mean(Simulated Benefits of 1 Trial Project 1 – Cost Project 1   
+    (Simulated Benefit of 1 Trial Project 2 – Cost Project 2 
+    (Simulated Benefit of 1 Trial Project 3 – Cost Project 3))) 
  
The results of experiment 2 are shown in Table 3.3.  In every scenario, it is the valuation 
of Project I which is the value of the entire project program. 
3.4.3. Results 
 As expected the values calculated by Benaroch et al. and Experiment 1 closely 
match, however the values understate the true value of the option chain.  The error is 
created when the mean expected value for each project is used instead of the actual value 
for each trial. For example in scenario 1 project 3 has a mean value of $19.33.  However, 
the median value of project 3 is $0.  $19.33 is greater than roughly 65% of the simulated 
trials.  This effect is that the Benaroch et al. passes $19.33 in value from project 3 to 
project 2 for each trial when over 50% of the time zero should be passed.  
When individual trials are valued and then averaged, the value of project 3 is 
concentrated in about one third of the instances.  This concentrated effect is more 
valuable because it starts a domino effect.  That is, if project 3 is valuable project 2 will 
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also be valuable and this value is passed onto project 1.  When the value from project 3 is 
spread out over more trials there are times when $19.33 is not enough to make project 2 
viable and the value from project 3 is lost. 
3.4.4. Are ROA Valuations Too High? 
 
“For all their theoretical attractiveness as a way to value growth projects, real options 
have had a difficult time catching on with managers. CFOs tell us that real options 
overestimate the value of uncertain projects, encouraging companies to overinvest in 
them. In the worst case, they grant excessively ambitious managers a license to gamble 
with shareholders' money. (Van Putton et al., 2004)” 
 
 One of the basic questions that researchers and practitioners grapple with is, “Are 
ROA valuations too high (Tallon et al., 2001)?”  ROA often gives valuations that are 
much higher than DCF would indicate, and some executives have said they are 
unrealistically high.  The above discussion gives insight into this question.  When the 
Black-Scholes and related option models are used the implication is that (1) executives 
have the freedom of action to cancel projects at little cost, and (2) much of the option 
value is concentrated in relatively few instances.  As noted in the last section, 65% of the 
trials generated less value than the expected value for project 3.  In practice this would 
mean that two out of three projects would appear to be overvalued when compared to 
actual results using the real option method. 
 The implication is that practitioners who use ROA need to be aware that much of 
the ROA value comes from relatively few of the possible events.  Most of the value 
comes from the few lucky projects, not the bulk of the projects.  Moreover, over half of 
the trials for project 3 resulted in zero value, meaning that in theory the project was 
cancelled at zero cost.  This is also somewhat unrealistic as few projects can be cancelled 
at zero cost. 
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3.5. Experiments using Copulas 
3.5.1. Correlation and Growth Options 
 When two or more IS/IT projects are built in a project programme, it is typical for 
the results to be correlated.  This is because the project teams used in a series of projects 
tend to contain the same employees, the same technologies, the same project leaders etc.  
For example, if an organization buys a new Web server and builds several growth options 
off of the initial Website, it would be likely that many of the people on the project teams 
are the same or at least communicate with each other.  It is likely they will share their 
knowledge, and it is likely that they will help each other avoid mistakes.  
 It is also likely that if the initial project in a program is poorly designed, the 
project team does not get along, or key personnel in the project are poorly trained or 
inexperienced etc., the entire chain of projects will underperform.  Either way, when a 
series of projects are built in an option chain, it is likely they will be positively correlated.   
 This gives another explanation for why the approach used by Benaroch et al. is 
incorrect.  If the first project in a series goes well the second project should also have a 
higher likelihood to succeed.  Using the Benaroch approach the expected value is added 
to each trial, so no projects do well and no projects do poorly, they all do average.   
dVt = r Vt dt + Vt σS dWt         (2) 
 
In order to create positive correlation between each project in the project 
programme, the  dW term of equation (2) for each project in the series should move 
together.  If dW1 is positive then dW2 should be more likely to be positive, as should 
dW3 etc. The effect is not absolute, project 1 could go very well and project 2 could still 
fail, but in general if project 1 does well project 2 should be more likely to succeed. 
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Proposition 3.a.: The Black-Scholes, Margrabe and Binomial model will 
understate/overstate the value of IS/IT investments as the correlation between the 
projects increases (ρ > 0) /decreases (ρ < 0). 
 
 Fortunately, the dWt terms can be easily correlated by using copula methods.  
Because a copula joins two or more marginal distributions, knowing the value of one 
marginal restricts the value of the second marginal, e.g. if a copula joins the functions 
F(x) and G(y), then knowing the value of F informs you about the value of G.  If the 
copula has a positive correlational structure then when F is large G will also tend to be 
large. 
Once the appropriate copula is chosen, the dW terms can then be correlated 
using Monte Carlo simulation by the following procedure (Nelson, 2006). 
 
5. Assume a copula, for example the Clayton copula  
C(u,v) = [u
-θ
 + v
-θ
 -1]
-1/θ 
 
6. Calculate the partial derivative ∂C/∂x and set w = ∂C/∂x  
w = u
-1-θ
 [ u
- θ
 + v
- θ
 - 1 ] 
-1/ θ - 1
  
 
7. Randomly generate two numbers, u and w in [0,1] 
 
8. Solve w = ∂C/∂x for y in terms of u and w.  
v = [ w
- θ
 
/(1+ θ) 
u
-θ
 - u
-θ
 + 1 ] 
-1/ θ  
 
dW1 and dW2 can then be determined from u and v using the appropriate inverse 
functions of the marginal distributions.  That is, if the marginal distributions are both 
Normal, then x and y can be found by using the function NORMINV() in Excel.   
Experiment 2 from section 3.4.2. was run again joining the dWt terms of the three 
projects using a three dimensional Normal copula to correlate the projects.  The results 
are shown in Table 3.4.  In every scenario, project value increases as correlation 
increases. 
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3.5.2. Skewness and Growth Options 
 
Proposition 3.b.: The Black-Scholes, Margrabe and Binomial model will 
understate/overstate the value of IS/IT investments as the skewness of the marginal 
distributions of the project Revenues increase/decrease. 
 
 Again the dWt terms were correlated this time using the Clayton copula for 
creating Lower Tail Dependence and the Gumbel copula for creating Upper Tail 
Dependence between the projects.   
Experiment 2 from section was run again joining the dWt terms of the three 
projects using the Normal copula to correlate the projects.  The results are shown in Table 
3.5.  As can be seen from the data, the skewness of the marginal distributions has a strong 
effect on growth option value.  Asymmetric correlation between growth options was also 
investigated to see if it had an effect on option value.  The results are shown in Tables 3.5 
and 3.6.  Asymmetric correlation was found not to not affect value in growth options. 
3.6. Results and Conclusions 
3.6.1. Recommendations for Practitioners 
 It appears from the experiments that a lot of the value from ROA comes from 
relatively rare big wins when everything works out well.  For practitioners this means 
that they need to view ROA valuations as risky valuations.   
 
 These projects may occasionally be very valuable, but often they will end up 
being worthless.  From the experiments it was clear that the median value for 
many projects was zero, see section 3.4.3.  Therefore, contingencies for shutting 
down projects are critical.  When executives complain that ROA valuations are 
too high they may be actually reacting to the ROA placing a lot of value in rare 
events. 
 
 Table 3.3. shows that using the expected mean undervalues projects that are deep 
out of the money but have lots of upside potential, such as innovative projects, 
e.g. scenarios 4, 5, 9. 
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 When projects are in the money, especially deep in the money, using the expected 
mean as a measure of growth option value is not as misleading, e.g. scenarios 1, 6, 
8. 
 
 Table 3.4. shows that highly correlated projects that are built in series are 
undervalued by as much as 30% by the Bardhan et al. and Benaroch et al. 
equations.  This is because those authors assumed the success of one project 
would not affect a follow on project. 
 
 Asymmetric correlation was not as serious a problem as in the case of correlated 
variables within a single project.   The more important issue is that correlation is 
included in the calculations, whether the correlation is symmetric or asymmetric 
does not appear to affect value. 
 
 Skewness determines the likelihood of having extremely high values.  When the 
marginal distributions are highly skewed, such as in the case of using the Black-
Scholes formula, some results may not be realistic.  Monte Carlo ROA can 
address this issue by truncating results that are executives think are beyond 
realistic. 
 
3.6.2. Discussion and Future Work 
 This paper contributes to the MIS research by extending prior work on valuing 
growth options.  In the past, correlation as a factor in option value has largely been 
ignored.   However, as more companies adopt COBIT and VAL IT, correlation will 
become a more important issue because these frameworks emphasize tracking project 
programmes instead of individual projects.   
A second issue that this paper raises is the need for caution when using traditional 
option models for evaluating chains of projects, something they were not designed to do.  
Because of Jensen’s inequality, using the mean expected value of future projects in the 
Binomial or Black and Scholes models is problematic. 
In the experiments used in this paper, it was apparent that much of the value of 
calculated by traditional ROA lies in relatively rare events.  This may explain why 
executives sometimes complain that ROA valuations are too high.  It also illustrates the 
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need to build contingency plans for shutting down projects into project plans.  Roughly 
half of the trials in the Monte Carlo experiments were worthless.  
The Wiener processes between the growth options were correlated using copula 
methods.  However, it is not clear that practitioners would be comfortable or accurate 
estimating the amount of correlation that exists between projects.  A promising area of 
research would be comparing estimated ROA models to ex-ante results.  Another 
important area involves calculating the value of multiple options within a single project.  
Finally, as more and more parameters are included in Monte Carlo models there exists 
the potential problem of over-fitting the results using in-sample data.  It would be 
interesting to compare the values and estimates of Monte Carlo techniques to simpler 
models using out of sample data. 
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3.8. Tables and Figures: 
 
Name Equation Parameter Dependence 
Frank 
Copula 
C(x,y) = (-1/θ) ln [1 – (1-e-θx)(1 – e –θy)/(1-eθ)]          θ in (-∞ , ∞) Symmetric 
Tails 
Clayton 
Copula 
C(x,y) = [x
-θ
 + y
-θ
 -1]
-1/θ
 θ in [0 , ∞) Lower Tail 
Gumbel 
Copula 
C(x,y) = Exp[-( (-ln(x)
 θ
 + (-ln(y)
 θ
)
1/ θ
] θ in (1 , ∞) Upper Tail 
Normal 
Copula 
C(x,y) = ∫∫1/2∏(1-ρ)1/2exp{(- x2 – 2 ρxy + y2)/2(1- 
ρ2)}dx dy 
 
 
Θ in [1 , 1] Symmetric 
and Elliptical 
Tails 
Table 3.1: Common copulas and their formulas (Armstrong, 2003) 
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Scenari
o 
Projec
t 
Stage 
Underlying 
Asset 
Strike 
Price 
Volatility Time to 
expire in 
years 
Benaroch 
Value 
Bardhan 
Value 
Simulated 
Value 
Experiment 
1 
1 I 100 90 0.50 0 42.49 44.44 42.41 
 II 100 90 0.50 0.5 32.49 34.44 32.41 
 III 100 90 0.50 1.0 19.41 19.41 19.33 
         
2 I 100 90 0.50 0 45.33 59.89 45.35 
 II 100 150 1.00 1.0 35.33 49.89 35.35 
 III 90 60 0.90 1.5 37.59 37.59 37.54 
         
         
3 I 100 90 0.50 0 46.45 62.64 46.43 
 II 100 150 1.00 1.0 36.45 52.64 36.43 
 III 90 60 0.90 1.8 41.68 41.68 41.78 
         
4 I 100 90 0.50 0 23.79 52.81 23.84 
 II 50  150 1.00 1.0 13.79 42.81 13.84 
 III 130 60 0.90 1.8 76.75 76.75 76.95 
         
5 I 100 90 0.50 0 20.06 52.32 20.06 
 II 40 150 0.50 1.0 10.06 42.32 10.06 
 III 140 60 0.50 1.8 85.98 85.98 85.75 
         
6 I 20 100 0.50 0 151.45* 155.01 151.65 
 II 200 120 0.50 1.0 231.45* 235.01 231.65 
 III 300 150 0.50 1.5 152.14 152.14 152.12 
         
7 I 100 90 0.50 0 57.66* 75.15 55.86 
 II 40 80 1.00 1.0 47.66* 65.15 45.86 
 III 140 60 0.90 1.8 87.75 87.75 85.97 
         
8 I 100 90 0.50 1.0 49.71 56.38 49.67 
 II 100 90 0.50 1.5 37.11 39.26 37.04 
 III 100 90 0.50 2.5 25.04 25.04 24.96 
         
9 I 100 90 0.50 1.0 30.43 59.07 30.48 
 II 40 150 1.0 2.0 10.06 42.32 10.10 
 III 140 60 0.90 2.8 85.98 85.98 85.93 
Table 3.2: Simulated data approximates the project values detailed by Benaroch et al.  Note, Scenario 7 appears to 
have been incorrectly calculated in the original paper.  However, the logic of the experiment is off because of the Flaw 
of Averages.  The values calculated are too low. 
 
*  Value was calculated using the approximate Binomial model. 
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Scenario 
 
 
(1) 
 
Projec
t 
Stage 
 
(2) 
Underlying 
Asset 
 
(3) 
Strike 
Price 
 
(4) 
Volatility 
 
 
(5) 
Time to 
expire in 
years 
(6) 
Benaroch 
Value 
(7) 
Bardhan 
Value 
 
(8) 
Simulated 
Value 
Experiment 
2 
(9) 
1 I 100 90 0.50 0 42.49 44.44 45.08 
 II 100 90 0.50 0.5 32.49 34.44 35.08 
 III 100 90 0.50 1.0 19.41 19.41 19.33 
         
2 I 100 90 0.50 0 45.33 59.89 51.91 
 II 100 150 1.00 1.0 35.33 49.89 41.91 
 III 90 60 0.90 1.5 37.59 37.59 37.54 
         
         
3 I 100 90 0.50 0 46.45 62.64 57.01 
 II 100 150 1.00 1.0 36.45 52.64 47.01 
 III 90 60 0.90 1.8 41.68 41.68 41.78 
         
4 I 100 90 0.50 0 23.79 52.81 48.47 
 II 50  15
0 
1.00 1.0 13.79 42.81 38.47 
 III 130 60 0.90 1.8 76.75 76.75 76.95 
         
5 I 100 90 0.50 0 20.06 52.32 48.65 
 II 40 150 0.50 1.0 10.06 42.32 38.65 
 III 140 60 0.50 1.8 85.98 85.98 85.75 
         
6 I 20 100 0.50 0 151.45* 155.01 157.59 
 II 200 120 0.50 1.0 231.45* 235.01 232.09 
 III 300 150 0.50 1.5 152.14 152.14 152.12 
         
7 I 100 90 0.50 0 57.66* 75.15 75.64 
 II 40 80 1.00 1.0 47.66* 65.15 65.64 
 III 140 60 0.90 1.8 87.75 87.75 85.97 
         
8 I 100 90 0.50 1.0 49.71 56.38 57.76 
 II 100 90 0.50 1.5 37.11 39.26 40.81 
 III 100 90 0.50 2.5 25.04 25.04 24.96 
         
9 I 100 90 0.50 1.0 30.43 59.07 59.88 
 II 40 150 1.0 2.0 10.06 42.32 38.84 
 III 140 60 0.90 2.8 85.98 85.98 85.93 
Table 3.3: Simulated data approximates the project values detailed by Benaroch et al.  Note, Scenario 7 appears to 
have been incorrectly calculated in the original paper.  When each individual trial is calculated and then all 10,000 
trial results are averaged the simulated results are higher than in the original paper, i.e. E[f(x)] > f(E[x])  
 
*  Value was calculated using the approximate Binomial model. 
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Base Scenario Rho Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 % of 
Base 
Case 
 
45.08 1 -0.5 42.62 32.62 19.21 0.95 
 1 -0.4 43.63 33.63 19.55 0.97 
 1 -0.2 44.54 34.54 19.71 0.99 
 1 0 44.98 34.98 19.35 1.00 
 1 0.2 45.36 35.36 19.04 1.01 
 1 0.4 45.93 35.93 19.24 1.02 
 1 0.5 46.75 36.75 18.89 1.04 
 1 0.6 47.04 37.04 19.51 1.04 
 1 0.8 47.72 37.72 19.29 1.06 
 1 1 48.70 38.70 19.45 1.08 
51.91 2 -0.5 44.05 34.05 37.76 0.85 
 2 -0.4 47.04 37.04 38.55 0.91 
 2 -0.2 48.21 38.21 37.85 0.93 
 2 0 50.70 40.70 37.15 0.98 
 2 0.2 53.56 43.56 38.18 1.03 
 2 0.4 55.22 45.22 36.41 1.06 
 2 0.5 56.19 46.19 37.14 1.08 
 2 0.6 61.25 51.25 37.68 1.18 
 2 0.8 62.24 52.24 38.70 1.20 
 2 1 66.17 56.17 38.14 1.27 
57.01 3 -0.5 49.94 39.94 41.65 0.88 
 3 -0.4 52.39 42.39 41.67 0.92 
 3 -0.2 53.83 43.83 41.54 0.94 
 3 0 55.77 45.77 41.30 0.98 
 3 0.2 58.04 48.04 42.26 1.02 
 3 0.4 61.74 51.74 41.76 1.08 
 3 0.5 62.23 52.23 40.38 1.09 
 3 0.6 63.05 53.05 41.52 1.11 
 3 0.8 65.80 55.80 40.60 1.15 
 3 1 68.85 58.85 40.77 1.21 
Table 3.4: Value as affected by correlation between projects 
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Base Scenario Rho Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 % of 
Base 
Case 
 
48.47 4 -0.5 40.76 30.76 76.09 0.84 
 4 -0.4 44.61 34.61 77.58 0.92 
 4 -0.2 46.16 36.16 75.89 0.95 
 4 0 47.62 37.62 75.80 0.98 
 4 0.2 50.68 40.68 76.63 1.05 
 4 0.4 53.01 43.01 77.92 1.09 
 4 0.5 54.59 44.59 75.97 1.13 
 4 0.6 54.86 44.86 77.36 1.13 
 4 0.8 55.55 45.55 74.55 1.15 
 4 1 60.62 50.62 76.91 1.25 
48.65 5 -0.5 41.11 31.11 83.21 0.85 
 5 -0.4 44.78 34.78 86.79 0.92 
 5 -0.2 47.20 37.20 86.56 0.97 
 5 0 47.25 37.25 84.38 0.97 
 5 0.2 49.73 39.73 84.66 1.02 
 5 0.4 53.00 43.00 86.75 1.09 
 5 0.5 53.32 43.32 84.44 1.10 
 5 0.6 57.01 47.01 87.35 1.17 
 5 0.8 58.65 48.65 86.52 1.21 
 5 1 58.88 48.88 85.35 1.21 
157.59 6 -0.5 153.65 231.23 151.34 0.98 
 6 -0.4 153.71 232.10 150.86 0.98 
 6 -0.2 156.15 232.48 152.55 0.99 
 6 0 158.38 231.56 152.71 1.00 
 6 0.2 159.51 234.13 153.11 1.01 
 6 0.4 162.01 232.58 151.66 1.03 
 6 0.5 163.52 234.38 151.94 1.04 
 6 0.6 164.04 234.04 152.49 1.04 
 6 0.8 165.63 233.65 152.06 1.05 
 6 1 168.90 235.84 152.78 1.07 
Table 3.4, continued 
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Base Scenario Rho Project1 Project2 Project3 % of 
Base 
Case 
 
75.64 7 -0.5 70.62 60.62 85.68 0.93 
 7 -0.4 74.46 64.46 85.34 0.98 
 7 -0.2 74.58 64.58 87.99 0.99 
 7 0 75.14 65.14 85.63 0.99 
 7 0.2 76.30 66.30 82.65 1.01 
 7 0.4 77.36 67.36 86.01 1.02 
 7 0.5 79.33 69.33 86.01 1.05 
 7 0.6 79.34 69.34 84.99 1.05 
 7 0.8 82.36 72.36 85.40 1.09 
 7 1 84.40 74.40 86.51 1.12 
57.76 8 -0.5 49.65 38.65 24.60 0.86 
 8 -0.4 51.17 39.23 25.33 0.89 
 8 -0.2 54.76 40.61 25.54 0.95 
 8 0 56.23 40.06 24.19 0.97 
 8 0.2 58.91 41.27 24.56 1.02 
 8 0.4 62.32 41.85 24.67 1.08 
 8 0.5 62.89 42.67 24.88 1.09 
 8 0.6 65.73 44.18 25.71 1.14 
 8 0.8 65.95 43.19 24.65 1.14 
 8 1 70.81 45.83 25.97 1.23 
59.88 9 -0.5 50.48 32.74 84.55 0.84 
 9 -0.4 52.07 34.21 85.80 0.90 
 9 -0.2 57.25 37.40 87.39 0.99 
 9 0 58.18 37.57 84.61 1.01 
 9 0.2 60.88 39.96 85.51 1.05 
 9 0.4 64.36 41.59 82.82 1.11 
 9 0.5 65.05 42.21 85.24 1.13 
 9 0.6 67.84 44.95 85.48 1.17 
 9 0.8 73.30 49.12 86.50 1.27 
 9 1 73.89 49.51 87.21 1.28 
Table 3.4, continued 
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Scenario Rho Clayton 
Copula 
% of Base 
Case 
Gumbel 
Copula 
% of Base 
Case 
Base 
Case 
Normal 
Copula 
1 0 46.02 102% 45.82 102% 45.12 
1 0.2 47.20 100% 46.88 99% 47.28 
1 0.4 47.03 100% 47.73 101% 47.21 
1 0.6 48.04 100% 47.51 99% 48.07 
       
2 0 51.91 97% 51.91 97% 53.41 
2 0.2 53.62 100% 55.79 104% 53.51 
2 0.4 56.35 98% 58.40 102% 57.50 
2 0.6 58.31 95% 60.15 98% 61.64 
2 0.8 59.99 101% 62.41 105% 59.57 
       
3 0 57.36 104% 57.36 104% 55.30 
3 0.2 59.94 100% 59.01 98% 60.06 
3 0.4 58.26 96% 61.53 101% 60.76 
3 0.6 62.52 94% 65.62 99% 66.55 
3 0.8 66.94 99% 68.84 102% 67.56 
       
4 0 48.02 101% 48.02 101% 47.60 
4 0.2 50.68 97% 53.15 102% 52.12 
4 0.4 50.81 96% 54.08 102% 53.18 
4 0.6 57.82 105% 53.16 96% 55.27 
4 0.8 57.28 95% 59.21 98% 60.43 
       
5 0 48.38 100% 48.38 100% 48.57 
5 0.2 49.83 98% 49.39 97% 51.06 
5 0.4 52.68 100% 56.14 106% 52.84 
5 0.6 53.74 100% 56.47 105% 53.84 
5 0.8 54.89 96% 56.97 100% 56.99 
       
6 0 157.47 99% 157.47 99% 158.78 
6 0.2 161.15 102% 159.25 101% 158.45 
6 0.4 163.98 102% 162.03 101% 160.49 
6 0.6 167.37 102% 163.12 100% 163.82 
6 0.8 168.19 100% 162.06 97% 167.75 
Table 3.5: There is little difference in value when asymmetric correlation exists between 
growth options.  The important issue is that correlation exists; symmetric or asymmetric does 
not make much difference. 
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7 0 75.08 99% 75.08 99% 75.96 
7 0.2 77.51 100% 78.43 101% 77.29 
7 0.4 78.30 100% 81.29 104% 78.02 
7 0.6 76.97 96% 81.02 101% 80.16 
7 0.8 83.44 101% 79.41 96% 82.52 
       
8 0 57.77 101% 57.77 101% 57.22 
8 0.2 59.72 98% 60.14 98% 61.07 
8 0.4 64.12 104% 61.27 100% 61.39 
8 0.6 64.13 102% 65.05 103% 63.05 
8 0.8 67.01 103% 66.76 102% 65.35 
       
9 0 60.12 103% 60.12 103% 58.23 
9 0.2 62.72 100% 65.27 104% 62.65 
9 0.4 64.21 95% 66.40 98% 67.64 
9 0.6 66.64 99% 69.95 103% 67.64 
9 0.8 68.49 99% 70.78 102% 69.27 
Table 3.5, continued 
 
Scenario Mean 
Clayton 
Skew 
Clayton 
% of Base Mean 
Gumbel 
Skew 
Gumbel 
% of 
Base 
Mean 
Normal 
Skew 
Normal 
1 44.71 1.05 103% 43.88 1.03 101% 43.47 1.06 
1 46.01 1.05 100% 45.88 1.05 100% 45.98 1.07 
1 47.22 1.06 99% 47.54 1.04 100% 47.58 1.04 
1 48.94 1.01 100% 47.90 1.06 98% 48.75 1.07 
2 45.35 1.46 100% 45.35 1.46 100% 45.24 1.45 
2 46.45 1.47 101% 46.39 1.42 100% 46.20 1.47 
2 48.65 1.50 101% 47.91 1.48 99% 48.20 1.44 
2 49.67 1.46 99% 49.09 1.53 98% 50.26 1.51 
2 50.36 1.42 101% 50.88 1.51 102% 49.74 1.47 
3 47.20 1.86 101% 47.20 1.86 101% 46.67 1.85 
3 49.14 1.97 100% 47.85 1.84 98% 49.05 1.72 
3 50.76 1.89 101% 49.61 1.83 99% 50.05 1.87 
3 52.15 1.74 98% 51.71 1.83 97% 53.24 1.66 
3 54.60 1.80 102% 53.84 1.86 101% 53.56 1.86 
4 49.85 2.12 102% 49.85 2.12 102% 48.94 2.28 
4 51.63 2.32 100% 51.60 2.22 100% 51.73 2.15 
4 53.22 2.03 100% 52.57 2.14 99% 53.31 2.22 
4 56.37 2.17 104% 52.31 2.15 97% 54.19 2.17 
4 56.62 2.05 100% 55.85 2.12 98% 56.76 2.25 
5 51.52 2.51 99% 51.52 2.51 99% 51.90 2.51 
Table 3.6: As skew increases value increases, but Tail Dependence between projects has little effect. 
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5 52.88 2.47 97% 52.04 2.42 95% 54.52 2.53 
5 56.18 2.41 101% 55.71 2.46 100% 55.85 2.54 
5 57.52 2.44 101% 57.04 2.45 100% 56.96 2.34 
5 58.56 2.52 99% 57.62 2.31 98% 58.87 2.45 
6 54.46 3.59 100% 54.46 3.59 100% 54.56 2.74 
6 56.68 3.09 101% 55.72 2.74 99% 56.00 2.84 
6 58.48 2.76 101% 58.25 2.62 101% 57.81 2.78 
6 60.55 2.69 102% 59.29 2.62 99% 59.64 2.76 
6 62.29 2.94 100% 59.70 2.85 96% 62.23 2.92 
7 56.93 2.97 100% 56.93 2.97 100% 56.85 3.26 
7 58.81 3.38 100% 59.03 3.09 101% 58.65 3.19 
7 60.64 3.29 101% 61.24 3.40 102% 60.05 3.29 
7 60.55 3.16 98% 61.72 3.27 100% 61.96 3.11 
7 64.48 3.53 101% 62.07 3.15 97% 63.88 3.03 
8 60.85 3.44 98% 61.61 3.47 99% 62.28 3.65 
8 65.01 3.67 104% 61.78 3.16 99% 62.23 3.37 
8 64.61 3.57 102% 65.43 4.25 103% 63.61 3.67 
8 66.97 3.61 103% 66.51 3.46 102% 65.19 3.44 
9 62.66 3.70 103% 62.66 3.70 103% 61.06 4.00 
9 65.71 4.86 99% 65.62 3.83 99% 66.51 4.48 
9 67.52 3.97 102% 67.85 3.96 103% 66.04 3.86 
9 67.99 4.06 100% 67.94 4.02 100% 67.84 3.82 
Table 3.6, continued 
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Figure 3.1: Density Function and Contour Plots of Common Copulas 
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Figure 3.1, continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Binomial Tree, From Benaroch et al. 2006 
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Chapter 4. Real Option Analysis “In” Projects 
 
Abstract 
 
Real options “In” projects are a relatively new area of study in the MIS literature.  
Unlike Real Options “On” Projects, e.g. a deferral option, which can almost always be 
initiated at will, Real Options “In” a project involve characteristics that typically have to 
be designed into a project.  For example, building a Web site can usually be deferred to a 
later date, but being able to scale a Web site from ten thousand hits a day to ten million 
hits a day or to switch an ecommerce site to a video streaming site, takes planning.  Such 
options involve design elements that are often mutually exclusive or that at least interact, 
i.e. a Web site optimized for fast video streaming is not likely optimized for secure 
financial transactions.  While traditional methods such as the Binomial model or the 
Black-Scholes model do not handle interactions easily, the methodology used in this 
paper, Monte Carlo Real Options Analysis (ROA), is ideal for investigating situations 
with many possible outcomes. 
4.1. Introduction 
 Real Option Analysis (ROA) has been an active stream of research in the MIS 
Literature for over a decade.  When uncertainty is high, managers can increase the value 
of their investments through active management.  According to this view managers that 
are able to start, stop, expand, scale back, switch usage, defer or abandon their projects in 
response to events will outperform managers that follow static project plans (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1993).  
Much of the early work in ROA focused on the utility of using ROA in MIS, and 
debated which option model was best suited to complex business investments (Benaroch 
et al., 2000; Benaroch et al.1999).  Almost all of the early work involved only single 
options that were assumed to be independent of other assets. The Black-Scholes model 
(1973) was the first widely used option model developed using partial differential 
equations and was followed by the Margrabe (1978) and the Binomial model several 
years later, (Cox et al, 1979).   Eventually the Binomial model became the dominant 
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model used in MIS because of its ease of use and wide applicability (Brach, 2003; 
Copeland and Antikarov, 2001; Amram and Kulatilaka,. 1999). 
Later research began to focus on the correct way to embed and identify options 
and risk factors in MIS projects. More recently the study of intra and inter-project 
interactions has been a subject of interest (Benaroch et al., 2006; Benaroch et al., 2005; 
Fichman, 2004; Bardhan et al., 2004; Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza, 2003; Benaroch, 
2002; Taudes et al., 2000).  One important conclusion of this research is that many 
options need to be designed into projects from the beginning.   
For example, in theory the option to expand a project always exists, however in 
reality there are limits to the changes that can be made to an IS/IT system before it 
breaks.  A simple local file server may be fine for a hundred users but not for ten 
thousand.  Alternatively, a file server hosted in the cloud may be easily expandable, but 
much slower than a local machine.  These design choices enable options that should be 
included in project valuations.  The more options that exist within a project, the more 
difficult it will be to use traditional models to evaluate them.  Fortunately a new 
technique is now available, Monte Carlo ROA using mathematical copulas.   
Monte Carlo is a method of simulation that uses random number generation to 
explore the range of possibilities that can occur in the system being modeled.  This is 
ideal for evaluating projects with multiple competing options because closed form 
solutions, like the Black-Scholes PDE, probably do not exist in these situations and the 
Binomial model is difficult to use for more than three or four possible scenarios (Herbst, 
2002).  
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The main goal of this paper is to illustrate the pitfalls involved in valuing multiple 
real options within a single project using a simple example and a Monte Carlo ROA 
simulation.  The rest of the paper is structured as follows; first ROA “In” projects are 
defined.  Next copula models are reviewed, followed by an illustrative case. Finally, 
results are discussed and advice for practitioners is given.  
4.2 Issues with Evaluating ROA “In” Projects 
 This paper focuses on ROA “In” projects, (Figure 4.1.), which usually refer to one 
or more options designed into the context of a single project.  Options to expand, 
contract, scale, outsource or switch usage of a project’s assets are typical real options “in” 
a project.   Multiple options “in” a project may be sub-additive, super-additive, or simply 
additive in terms of option value.   
 A defining characteristic of these types of options is that they usually cannot be 
exercised unless they were specifically designed into the project from the beginning 
(Benaroch, 2002).  While real options “on” a project, like the option to defer, require no 
real skill to invoke, ROA “in” projects require forethought and may be path dependent.  
For example, a firm that builds a Web site can use Java, or ASP.Net, but probably not 
both.  Choosing Java most likely means that Oracle and Linux will be involved while 
choosing ASP.Net probably means SQL Server and Windows will be used.  These 
involve different skillsets and require investments in different kinds of resources. 
4.3. Copulas 
 The difficulty with any Monte Carlo model is being able to specify the parameters 
and rules of the simulation correctly.  In the past it was often difficult to simulate 
correlation between variables unless they belonged to one of the well-known multivariate 
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distributions.  This was a limitation of the techniques used to generate random numbers 
using the software packages widely available before the year 2000.   
 For example, if height and weight are positively correlated, height and self-esteem 
are positively correlated, and weight and self-esteem are negatively correlated it is 
difficult to generate sensible random numbers that fit this pattern using traditional 
methods.  Fortunately, it is now possible to specify a particular correlation between 
random variables using mathematical copulas, a technique developed by Nelson in 1999 
and quickly incorporated into R, SAS and SPSS. 
 Essentially copulas break apart a multivariate distribution into its component 
parts, the joint relationships and the marginal relationships.  The joint relationships can 
be used with any number of different marginal distributions to produce different 
multivariate distributions.  That is, the joint correlation between height, weight and self-
esteem would be handled separately from the range, variance and density functions of 
these variables.  This makes generating sensible random numbers much easier using 
Sklar’s theory. 
 Sklar’s Theory relates a multivariate distribution to its marginal and joint 
portions, “Copulas are functions that join multivariate distribution functions to their one-
dimensional marginal distribution functions” (p. 5, Nelsen, 1999).  More formally, 
 
“Let H be a joint distribution function with margins F and G.  Then there exists a copula 
C such that for all x,y in R, 
 
H(x,y) = C(F(x), G(y)). 
 
If F and G are continuous, then C is unique; otherwise, C is uniquely determined on 
Range F x Range G.” (Nelson, 2006, pg.21; Ponzo, 2008).   
 
85 
 
In practical terms, this means that if you want to generate a multivariate distribution H, 
with marginals F and G, you only need to generate random numbers for F and G as if 
they were independent, and then find the copula function C that relates F and G with the 
appropriate joint relationship.  While this is an advanced mathematical technique, modern 
computers are able to perform the necessary calculations in seconds. 
Sklar’s theorem applies to all copulas, but there is one family of easy to use 
copulas that is available for all of the major statistical packages, e.g. Matlab, R, SAS, 
SPSS, Excel etc.  They are the Archimedean copulas Clayton, Gumbel and Frank.  The 
definitions of these copulas are given in Table 4.1 and their density functions and contour 
plots are shown in Figure 4.2.  Additionally, Nelson (2006, 1999) and Armstrong (2003) 
detail 22 different copulas which create different levels of skewness and tail dependence 
in the multivariate distributions they create.  Custom copulas can also be created 
empirically using raw data.   
4.4. Illustrative Case 
4.4.1 Case Background 
 In order to illustrate the problem of ROA “In” projects with a simple example, 
“the option to switch”, consider a magazine publishing company that wishes to create a 
new e-Zine.  The project will be an online extension for one of its three current paper 
magazine offerings, “New Age Music”, “Vegetarian Cooking” or “Pilates Yoga” 
depending on which magazine is most in demand at the time of launch.  This project will 
involve a major investment of time, money, graphic artists, writers and software 
developers which will make it possible to only develop one of the offerings.   
 The underlying technology will be the same in all three cases, so the hardware 
and software needed to run the e-Zine will be identical, the only major difference 
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between the sites will be in content, a.k.a. the option to switch.  For simplicity it is 
assumed that estimates of potential benefits, costs, variance and time involved are 
approximately the same; volatility is 0.50, time is 1 year, cost is $900,000, and the 
expected benefit from online revenue and increased magazine subscriptions is $1,000,000 
(Table 2). 
 Although this may seem like a simple investment, it actually has some potential 
hazards for the unwary.  From a technical standpoint the three sites will have to be 
carefully analyzed to make sure they will require the same equipment.  The yoga site may 
require more video streaming; the music e-Zine may need the ability to take credit card 
purchases for music sales and the cooking site might require more database functionality 
to handle recipes etc.  In the real world all of these design issues would have to be 
investigated thoroughly and weighed against expected cost.  However, design issues are 
not the focus of this paper and these issues will not be discussed further. 
 The more important issue to consider is that three distinct options exist; first, the 
new age music site, second the vegetarian cooking site, third the Pilates yoga site.  Using 
the Black-Scholes model all three of the sites are estimated to be worth the same amount 
and it is tempting to value the new Web site as simply the Mean expected value of the 
three options or roughly $250,000.  However, this would be a mistake, because the three 
e-Zines represent three separate chances for the project to make money.  The company 
will build the site that is showing the most promise at the time of launch, so they will 
probably do better than average.  If one of the e-Zines is worth $250,000 by itself a 
rational person would pay more than $250,000 for three such options.  
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 It is also obviously incorrect to add the Mean expected values of the three options 
together.  Only one website can be built and although the company will build the most 
promising of the three its volatility is only 0.5, so the value must be less than $750,000.  
Therefore, the three options together must be worth between $250,000 and $750,000. 
A third more subtle error would be to assume the three sites are uncorrelated.  The 
three subjects, new age music, vegetarian cooking and Pilates yoga likely overlap in their 
customer base.    If the company’s customer base among yoga practitioners is declining, 
it is likely that its base of vegetarians and new age music aficionados is also declining.  
Alternatively, on the technical side, if the employees have difficulty installing the 
required hardware, if key personnel are lost, if the project team does not get along, or if 
the company itself has budgetary problems, all three Websites will be affected negatively.  
The question is how much does correlation matter? 
4.4.2. Monte Carlo Experiment 
 For the experiment three options were simulated consistent with the basic Black-
Scholes equations using a Wiener process, equation (1), following the guidelines of 
Brandimarte, (ch. 8).   
dV = r V dt + V σS dW         (1) 
 
Where  
 
V = the current asset value 
r = risk free rate 
σv = asset volatility 
W = Brownian motion 
 
In theory, the dW terms for the three separate options should be correlated and this was 
accomplished by using a Normal, Clayton, and Gumbel copula to produce no tail 
dependence, lower tail dependence and upper tail dependence respectively for 
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correlations ranging from 0.2 to 1.0.  Random numbers for 100,000 trials of each level of 
correlation were generated, and the deciles of option value resulting for all three 
individual options were calculated (Table 2). The value of the options for each trial was 
calculated as,  
 
Max(Option New Age Music, Option vegetarian cooking, Option Pilates yoga, 0 ) 
 
4.5. Discussion and Recommendation for Practitioners 
4.5.1. Discussion 
 As can be seen in Table 2 and in Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, the value of one of the 
three options considered alone is roughly $250,000.  The value of the three options taken 
together is between $550,000 and $580,000 when the three investments are uncorrelated. 
As the three investments become more correlated they lose value quickly, dropping to 
$250,000 when the Normal copula is used and perfect correlation exists. 
From the boxplots, Figures, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, all of the investments follow the 
same pattern; as correlation increases, the combination of three options becomes less 
valuable.  The reasoning is that if one investment randomly has a low value, one of the 
other two investments can be chosen instead.  If the yoga e-Zine is not in demand, the 
new age music e-Zine might be.  However, as the investments become more and more 
correlated, the three investments no longer act as viable alternatives.  This loss in value 
because of correlated returns is reminiscent of the old adage, “When the tide goes out, all 
of the boats go down”.   
4.5.2. Recommendations for Practitioners and Conclusion 
The data even from this simple suggests that practitioners should be very 
concerned about interactions between options “In” projects.  Rather than assuming 
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independence as is usually done within the MIS literature, care should be taken to 
account for correlation.  The resulting loss in value due to the investments being poor 
substitutes (or highly correlated), is up to 43%!   
The lesson to be learned here is that options within a project are highly sensitive 
to interactions, remembering that this was a very simple example that ignored design 
issues. In the real world, where people are building MIS systems that interact with many 
other systems, value can be reduced without even knowing the cause, i.e. switching from 
one vendor’s equipment to another’s can generate side effects that were not originally 
intended due to lack of compatibility.  For example, just switching from a Macintosh 
based environment to a PC environment changes the fonts available for report writing. 
 Another lesson that is important to be learned from the decile information given 
in Table 2 is that even when investing in the most promising of the three Web sites, over 
10% of the time the combined option value of the system was zero, while the maximum 
value was 18 times the average value.  That is, the distribution of option returns is not 
uniform or symmetric, it is highly skewed, and this is generally true for all technology 
investments.  Many promising IS/IT projects fail, e.g. Hilton’s reservation system, and 
many do far better than expected, e.g. Facebook.  This is the nature of MIS. 
 Therefore, it is important for executives to plan for a wide range of contingencies, 
from huge successes to complete failure, not just for the expected mean value of a 
project.  If the hardware purchased is unable to scale well, the potential profits from 
runaway successes are lost.  On the other hand, if the firm buys a lot of equipment hoping 
for success, it may find itself with lots of equipment but no customers.  Thus managers 
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should make arrangements for easily expanding their systems if needed, perhaps by using 
cloud computing, and whenever possible stage system development in phases. 
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4.7. Tables and Figures: 
 
Name Equation Parameter Dependence 
Frank 
Copula 
C(x,y) = (-1/θ) ln [1 – (1-e-θx)(1 – e –θy)/(1-eθ)]          θ in (-∞ , ∞) Symmetric Tails 
Clayton 
Copula 
C(x,y) = [x
-θ
 + y
-θ
 -1]
-1/θ
 θ in [0 , ∞) Lower Tail 
Gumbel 
Copula 
C(x,y) = Exp[-( (-ln(x)
 θ
 + (-ln(y)
 θ
)
1/ θ
] θ in (1 , ∞) Upper Tail 
Normal 
Copula 
C(x,y) = ∫∫1/2∏(1-ρ)1/2exp{(- x2 – 2 ρxy + 
y
2
)/2(1- ρ2)}dx dy 
 
 
Θ in [1 , 1] Symmetric and 
Elliptical 
Tails 
Table 4.1: Common copulas and their formulas (Armstrong, 2003) 
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Rho Mean 
Music 
Mean 
Cooking 
Mean 
Yoga 
Mean 
System 
decile 
1 
decile 
2 
1st 
quartile 
decile 
3 
decile 
4 
median decile 
6 
decile 
7 
decile 
8 
decile 
9 
decile 
10 
Maximum 
Clayton Copula, data * $10,000 
0.2 24.99 25.14 24.76 55.77 0.00 3.81 10.48 16.95 29.10 41.67 55.61 72.37 82.33 93.89 130.30 839.28 
0.4 25.27 25.11 25.25 53.60 0.00 0.00 4.13 11.25 24.71 38.23 53.01 70.69 81.13 93.48 130.47 698.35 
0.6 25.24 25.22 25.01 50.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.97 17.54 32.45 48.26 66.78 77.81 90.92 129.03 919.95 
0.8 24.87 25.13 25.09 45.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.34 22.72 39.96 60.10 71.97 85.94 125.37 654.50 
1 25.24 25.30 25.30 33.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.48 16.87 33.87 44.87 58.49 105.02 708.66 
Gumbel Copula, data * $10,000 
0 25.06 25.08 25.32 58.49 0.00 10.13 16.21 21.82 33.22 44.99 58.33 74.22 83.86 95.69 131.63 947.91 
0.2 25.11 25.08 25.07 53.00 0.00 4.38 10.18 15.93 27.14 38.89 51.78 67.51 77.33 88.84 124.24 750.60 
0.4 25.03 24.82 24.74 47.34 0.00 0.00 4.46 9.99 20.84 32.34 45.29 60.96 70.40 81.53 116.23 783.18 
0.6 25.12 24.98 25.04 42.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.77 14.57 25.81 38.71 54.10 63.39 74.63 108.82 768.59 
0.8 25.00 25.10 25.00 36.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.83 18.02 30.51 45.71 54.89 66.05 99.79 683.65 
Normal Copula, data * $10,000 
0 25.06 24.85 25.25 58.14 0.00 9.93 15.85 21.58 32.85 44.59 57.96 73.79 83.77 95.37 130.94 850.71 
0.2 24.78 24.86 24.95 53.98 0.00 3.23 9.41 15.29 27.03 39.34 52.87 69.28 79.56 91.50 127.19 731.23 
0.4 25.11 25.01 25.01 50.09 0.00 0.00 3.41 9.37 21.20 33.79 47.74 64.29 74.51 86.80 124.15 754.91 
0.6 25.15 25.01 25.09 45.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.69 14.49 26.96 40.93 57.88 68.28 80.86 118.48 681.39 
0.8 24.87 24.94 24.92 38.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.24 18.38 31.81 48.46 58.54 70.94 108.16 824.49 
1 24.93 24.93 24.93 24.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 11.84 26.42 35.16 45.94 79.47 534.12 
Table 4.2: The mean expected value of the three options is roughly $250,000.  However, the mean expected value of the three options together varied by the amount of correlation 
and the copula involved.  The maximum value of the system was $581k, the minimum was $249k 
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Figure 4.1: ROA “on”, “in” and “between” projects, (Wang, 2005) 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 4.2: Density Function and Contour Plots of Common Copulas 
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Figure 4.2, continued 
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Figure: 4.3: Boxplot of the value of three options as correlation increases, using the Clayton 
Copula. 
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Figure: 4.4: Boxplot of the value of three options as correlation increases using the Gumbel 
Copula. 
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Figure: 4.5: Boxplot of the value of three options as correlation increases, using the 
Normal Copula. 
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Appendix A: Selected Simulated Data 
 
 
Copula Rho 
Sigma 
Revenue Sigma Costs Revenue Cost Date 
Calculate
d Value 
Simulated 
Values Sharpe Med Q3 Max St. Dev 
Skew 
Revenues 
Excee
dance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 32,024 
        
                
Normal 1.00) 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 76,033 76,301 0.51 - 112,431 880,515 132,776 1.1080 NA 
 
(0.50) 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 63,159 62,822 0.48 - 88,265 819,739 113,867 1.1219 0.0049 
 
- 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 47,826 48,567 0.43 - 62,767 698,240 92,677 1.1437 
(0.011
9) 
 
0.20 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 40,651 40,544 0.41 - 48,870 650,722 80,479 1.1429 0.0002 
 
0.40 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 32,586 32,831 0.36 - 35,760 552,760 67,727 1.1255 0.0051 
 
0.60 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 23,234 23,061 0.30 - 18,586 428,370 51,237 1.1194 0.0387 
 
0.80 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 11,824 11,630 0.13 - 398 270,510 30,238 1.1236 0.0522 
 
1.00 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 - - NA - - - - 1.1271 - 
                
Clayton (1.00) 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 76,033 75,773 0.51 - 111,324 904,737 132,914 1.1274 NA 
 
(0.47) 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 63,159 61,843 0.49 - 88,561 772,872 110,642 1.1406 0.4911 
 
(0.00) 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 47,826 47,567 0.44 - 61,606 692,874 90,797 1.1177 0.0080 
 
0.19 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 40,651 41,200 0.40 - 46,630 660,508 83,343 1.1045 
(0.207
6) 
 
0.39 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 32,586 33,692 0.35 - 30,643 647,676 73,934 1.1380 
(0.402
5) 
 
0.57 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 23,234 25,646 0.28 - 12,245 591,818 63,759 1.1522 
(0.525
5) 
 
0.77 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 11,824 16,219 0.16 - - 538,936 50,364 1.1432 
(0.610
7) 
 
1.00 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 - 6,848 (0.04) - - 194,124 31,814 1.1274 0.0761 
                
Gumbel 0.18 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 40,651 39,044 0.40 - 45,958 601,851 77,709 1.1493 0.2268 
 
0.39 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 32,586 30,250 0.35 - 30,907 488,998 62,853 1.1352 0.3076 
 
0.58 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 23,234 20,474 0.27 - 12,824 382,375 46,873 1.1323 0.3576 
 
0.78 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 11,824 10,240 0.08 - 8 243,595 27,761 1.1095 0.3293 
 
1.00 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 - NA NA - - NA NA NA NA 
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Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma Costs Revenue Cost Date Calculate
d Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maxim
um 
St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Excee
dance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 96,830         
                
Frank (1.00) 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 76,033 75,776 0.51 - 111,348 895,405 132,894 1.1274 NA 
 
(0.49) 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 63,159 63,972 0.50 - 96,289 766,005 111,427 1.1406 0.0187 
 
(0.00) 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 47,826 47,567 0.44 - 61,606 692,874 90,797 1.1177 0.0080 
 
0.19 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 40,651 40,907 0.40 - 48,484 650,207 81,738 1.1045 
(0.007
7) 
 
0.38 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 32,586 33,319 0.35 - 32,751 616,477 71,709 1.1380 
(0.039
0) 
 
0.59 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 23,234 24,771 0.28 - 16,793 586,495 59,582 1.1522 
(0.042
4) 
 
0.79 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 11,824 14,474 0.15 - 323 490,074 42,510 1.1432 
(0.070
4) 
 
1.00 0.5 0.5 342,216 400,000 Jul-87 - 34 (8.13) - - 30,275 980 1.1246 
(0.006
0) 
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opula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Q2 Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew  
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 360,083 400,000 Jan-
88 
66,093         
                
Normal (0.50) 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 108,232 108,056 0.53 - 158,923 1,500,594 187,385 1.7757 0.0212 
 - 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 86,167 86,644 0.50 - 122,607 1,341,431 156,384 1.7551 (0.0070) 
 0.20 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 75,612 75,938 0.48 - 104,264 1,225,344 140,175 1.7199 (0.0065) 
 0.40 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 63,525 64,169 0.46 - 85,824 1,081,356 121,142 1.7430 0.0398 
 0.60 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 49,102 49,433 0.42 - 61,829 897,237 97,566 1.7222 0.0456 
 0.80 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 30,377 30,507 0.35 - 33,702 592,293 64,619 1.7093 0.0750 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 - - NA - - - - 1.7240 - 
                
Clayton (1.00) 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 126,307 125,907 0.56 50 191,794 1,575,616 210,943 1.7311 NA 
 (0.47) 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 108,232 105,016 0.54 - 157,790 1,400,737 179,191 1.7339 0.4783 
 (0.00) 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 86,167 86,434 0.50 - 121,306 1,324,948 156,080 1.7127 0.0081 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 75,612 75,846 0.47 - 99,269 1,269,552 144,393 1.7323 (0.1993) 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 63,525 65,650 0.43 - 77,293 1,217,067 132,737 1.7327 (0.3856) 
 0.58 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 49,102 53,768 0.39 - 53,764 1,137,739 118,133 1.6826 (0.5167) 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 30,377 38,903 0.30 - 23,287 1,124,897 102,702 1.7370 (0.6078) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 - 5,390 (0.10) - - 353,179 27,138 1.7311 0.0251 
                
Gumbel (0.00) 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 86,167 86,327 0.50 - 120,608 1,287,970 156,278 1.7311 0.0073 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 75,612 71,945 0.49 - 100,138 1,093,010 131,505 1.7107 0.2318 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 63,525 58,869 0.46 - 80,150 917,640 109,844 1.7465 0.3544 
 0.58 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 49,102 43,152 0.42 - 55,540 708,056 83,956 1.7857 0.3903 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 30,377 25,254 0.33 - 27,625 441,181 52,762 1.7649 0.3525 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 - NA NA - - NA NA NA NA 
                
                
                
Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Q2 Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 96,830         
                
Frank (1.00) 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 126,307 125,911 0.56 47 191,874 1,564,831 210,893 1.7311 NA 
 (0.49) 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 108,232 108,428 0.55 - 166,641 1,403,573 182,180 1.7339 0.0089 
 (0.00) 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 86,167 86,434 0.50 - 121,306 1,324,948 156,080 1.7127 0.0081 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 75,612 75,120 0.47 - 99,982 1,259,429 141,914 1.7323 (0.0040) 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 63,525 63,394 0.44 - 78,638 1,203,112 126,734 1.7327 (0.0441) 
 0.59 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 49,102 50,999 0.39 - 58,317 1,114,254 109,464 1.6826 (0.0716) 
 0.79 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 30,377 34,618 0.31 - 32,047 995,248 85,736 1.7370 (0.0855) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 360,083 400,000 Jan-88 - 233 (1.31) - - 176,785 5,923 1.7061 (0.0101) 
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Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 96,830         
                
Normal (1.00) 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 166,731 166,221 0.57 354 252,329 2,296,489 277,246 2.2655 NA 
 (0.50) 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 145,197 145,223 0.55 477 209,229 2,147,493 251,425 2.1994 0.0102 
 - 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 118,437 117,542 0.51 97 161,069 2,042,108 215,890 2.3228 (0.0019) 
 0.20 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 105,466 104,667 0.50 57 141,702 1,863,792 194,382 2.2981 0.0204 
 0.40 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 90,476 90,700 0.48 44 119,764 1,578,298 170,241 2.1493 0.0111 
 0.60 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 72,384 71,975 0.46 - 92,424 1,341,328 139,100 2.2202 0.0512 
 0.80 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 48,444 48,569 0.41 - 58,759 1,065,507 99,402 2.2927 0.0795 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 - - NA - - - - 2.1463 - 
                
Clayton (1.00) 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 166,731 166,100 0.57 809 251,439 2,334,574 277,674 2.2841 NA 
 (0.46) 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 145,197 141,776 0.55 349 209,609 2,092,629 242,225 2.2420 0.4909 
 0.00 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 118,437 118,015 0.51 131 161,546 1,994,667 215,782 2.2624 0.0034 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 105,466 107,784 0.49 47 140,193 2,081,641 205,339 2.3726 (0.1885) 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 90,476 94,511 0.45 - 111,393 1,901,606 190,172 2.2367 (0.3599) 
 0.58 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 72,384 80,760 0.41 - 83,243 1,927,653 177,681 2.3408 (0.5106) 
 0.77 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 48,444 60,842 0.35 - 47,431 1,670,861 152,035 2.1913 (0.5955) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 - 5,678 (0.06) - - 767,165 36,002 2.2841 (0.0095) 
                
Gumbel (0.00) 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 118,437 118,254 0.51 132 161,126 2,047,787 215,221 2.2841 (0.0008) 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 105,466 100,356 0.50 28 137,623 1,712,661 183,691 2.2652 0.2553 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 90,476 82,319 0.49 - 111,853 1,374,703 151,325 2.2985 0.3616 
 0.58 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 72,384 63,657 0.47 23 86,469 1,052,529 117,463 2.1875 0.3959 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 48,444 40,318 0.42 - 53,211 653,997 76,192 2.2752 0.3667 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 - NA NA - - NA NA NA NA 
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Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 96,830         
                
Frank (1.00) 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 166,731 166,102 0.57 810 251,486 2,327,392 277,636 2.2841 NA 
 (0.49) 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 145,197 146,432 0.56 616 220,062 2,117,227 247,352 2.2420 0.0162 
 0.00 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 118,437 118,015 0.51 131 161,546 1,994,667 215,782 2.2624 0.0034 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 105,466 105,993 0.48 48 139,497 2,030,323 202,159 2.3726 (0.0219) 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 90,476 91,974 0.46 1 114,912 1,863,004 182,234 2.2367 (0.0303) 
 0.59 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 72,384 75,541 0.42 - 87,924 1,818,713 161,521 2.3408 (0.0726) 
 0.79 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 48,444 54,385 0.36 - 57,039 1,591,302 130,482 2.1913 (0.1033) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 - 542 (0.63) - - 336,588 11,828 2.2076 (0.0137) 
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Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 123,786         
                
Normal (0.50) 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 176,046 177,053 0.53 2,225 247,643 2,958,896 316,144 2.7911 0.0166 
 - 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 145,759 146,225 0.51 817 192,801 2,731,745 272,418 2.7089 0.0020 
 0.20 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 130,911 130,613 0.49 1,017 169,800 2,563,983 249,050 2.7183 0.0110 
 0.40 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 113,633 114,317 0.47 615 144,874 2,364,605 223,447 2.7239 0.0020 
 0.60 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 92,621 93,285 0.45 490 115,161 2,036,361 187,381 2.6884 0.0322 
 0.80 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 64,552 64,608 0.43 144 77,466 1,519,218 132,906 2.8682 0.0847 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 - - NA - - - - 2.7289 - 
                
Clayton (1.00) 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 200,027 198,980 0.57 3,318 292,990 2,890,678 336,719 2.6326 NA 
 (0.47) 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 176,046 172,598 0.54 3,230 245,049 3,031,527 306,133 2.9427 0.5064 
 0.00 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 145,759 146,648 0.51 1,743 195,614 2,840,184 274,382 2.8529 (0.0032) 
 0.18 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 130,911 134,136 0.48 940 166,974 2,811,595 262,685 2.8209 (0.1935) 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 113,633 120,107 0.45 522 138,975 2,659,191 248,041 2.7627 (0.3530) 
 0.57 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 92,621 104,591 0.41 107 106,786 2,657,749 234,146 2.8149 (0.5029) 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 64,552 81,483 0.36 5 66,694 2,448,447 204,702 2.7125 (0.5964) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 - 6,577 (0.03) - - 951,312 44,673 2.6326 (0.0255) 
                
Gumbel 0.00 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 145,759 144,528 0.51 1,571 191,166 2,564,951 268,924 2.6326 (0.0059) 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 130,911 125,993 0.51 1,618 168,063 2,351,223 233,178 2.7814 0.2468 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 113,633 104,448 0.50 1,302 139,408 1,865,047 192,664 2.7751 0.3560 
 0.57 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 92,621 80,757 0.49 337 108,929 1,429,236 148,411 2.8429 0.4326 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 64,552 53,573 0.46 76 72,053 919,114 98,573 2.8072 0.3779 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 - NA NA NA - NA NA NA NA 
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Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 96,830         
                
Frank (1.00) 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 200,027 198,978 0.57 3,362 293,036 2,884,633 336,685 2.6326 NA 
 (0.48) 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 176,046 178,364 0.54 3,497 254,994 3,074,171 313,495 2.9427 0.0328 
 0.00 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 145,759 146,648 0.51 1,743 195,614 2,840,184 274,382 2.8529 (0.0032) 
 0.20 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 130,911 131,683 0.48 1,539 166,657 2,786,863 256,491 2.8209 (0.0194) 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 113,633 116,063 0.46 451 140,082 2,564,449 236,287 2.7627 (0.0245) 
 0.58 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 92,621 98,602 0.42 612 110,837 2,550,878 215,878 2.8149 (0.0695) 
 0.79 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 64,552 72,803 0.36 14 73,958 2,273,936 178,137 2.7125 (0.1374) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 389,207 400,000 Jan-89 - 1,566 (0.22) - - 786,040 28,716 2.7622 (0.0226) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
 
Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 144,565         
                
Normal (1.00) 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 224,844 227,041 0.54 6,865 324,767 3,876,585 399,418 3.2924 NA 
 (0.50) 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 199,241 199,542 0.52 6,029 269,249 3,746,150 367,720 3.2112 0.0023 
 - 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 166,391 167,118 0.49 3,397 210,491 3,404,716 324,212 3.1007 (0.0143) 
 0.20 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 150,113 151,091 0.47 1,659 186,721 3,419,237 304,161 3.2779 (0.0067) 
 0.40 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 131,048 130,069 0.46 1,392 154,784 3,017,157 268,022 3.1220 0.0131 
 0.60 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 107,714 106,255 0.45 1,861 125,064 2,471,314 219,638 3.0908 0.0518 
 0.80 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 76,330 76,803 0.41 624 87,210 2,016,808 166,112 3.3300 0.0921 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 - - NA - - - - 3.3134 - 
                
Clayton (1.00) 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 224,844 225,189 0.55 5,477 321,641 3,768,381 393,763 3.1705 NA 
 (0.47) 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 199,241 193,668 0.52 3,876 265,707 3,650,945 354,944 3.2735 0.4865 
 0.00 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 166,391 165,945 0.48 2,878 208,241 3,662,354 327,182 3.4101 (0.0030) 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 150,113 152,799 0.47 3,163 183,947 3,408,394 309,798 3.2591 (0.1828) 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 131,048 139,222 0.44 1,529 153,563 3,304,591 296,565 3.1869 (0.3451) 
 0.57 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 107,714 123,615 0.40 1,104 121,196 3,419,680 287,071 3.2873 (0.4934) 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 76,330 96,343 0.36 458 76,421 3,161,101 248,818 3.1889 (0.6039) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 - 8,550 0.01 - - 1,447,478 62,217 3.1705 (0.0389) 
                
Gumbel (0.00) 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 166,391 166,599 0.49 2,977 211,679 3,438,234 323,580 3.1705 (0.0030) 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 150,113 143,226 0.49 3,227 182,959 2,997,836 276,134 3.3825 0.2839 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 131,048 118,951 0.49 2,345 152,300 2,373,125 227,389 3.1866 0.3767 
 0.58 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 107,714 92,950 0.48 1,618 120,738 1,817,288 175,922 3.4671 0.4401 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 76,330 62,421 0.46 500 81,408 1,150,826 117,319 3.3034 0.3856 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 - NA NA NA - NA NA NA NA 
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Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 96,830         
                
Frank (1.00) 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 224,844 225,188 0.55 5,484 321,653 3,763,136 393,714 3.1705 NA 
 (0.49) 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 199,241 200,301 0.53 4,466 277,687 3,677,791 363,312 3.2735 0.0415 
 0.00 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 166,391 165,945 0.48 2,878 208,241 3,662,354 327,182 3.4101 (0.0030) 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 150,113 148,704 0.46 1,812 178,225 3,431,102 304,450 3.2591 (0.0174) 
 0.39 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 131,048 133,679 0.44 1,954 154,057 3,376,194 285,096 3.1869 (0.0533) 
 0.59 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 107,714 112,845 0.40 1,152 118,291 3,260,706 260,839 3.2873 (0.0800) 
 0.79 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 76,330 85,214 0.35 784 81,303 2,965,845 218,344 3.1889 (0.1493) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 395,566 400,000 Jul-89 - 2,541 (0.13) - - 1,167,236 41,450 3.4558 (0.0256) 
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Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 152,955         
                
Normal (1.00) 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 235,089 234,583 0.52 3,443 322,552 4,707,259 433,730 3.8634 NA 
 (0.50) 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 208,815 209,277 0.49 2,872 268,531 4,472,418 409,135 3.7839 0.0360 
 - 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 174,573 173,921 0.46 1,742 206,125 4,409,719 365,504 3.9487 (0.0135) 
 0.20 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 157,425 157,263 0.44 1,568 183,251 4,304,832 338,874 4.0301 (0.0018) 
 0.40 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 137,219 136,768 0.43 775 152,826 3,608,915 299,117 3.7270 0.0201 
 0.60 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 112,334 111,919 0.41 701 120,439 3,094,821 251,991 3.6850 0.0533 
 0.80 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 78,668 79,066 0.39 186 82,501 2,337,671 183,133 3.5863 0.0934 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 - - NA - - - - 3.7779 - 
                
Clayton (1.00) 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 235,089 236,818 0.52 3,331 324,116 4,675,963 439,389 3.8447 NA 
 (0.47) 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 208,815 202,652 0.49 3,224 266,707 4,532,642 393,709 3.9011 0.4838 
 (0.00) 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 174,573 175,517 0.46 1,615 208,358 4,316,328 365,310 3.7883 0.0080 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 157,425 160,823 0.43 996 180,613 4,389,143 353,354 4.0227 (0.1719) 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 137,219 148,532 0.41 935 152,878 4,293,307 344,053 3.8766 (0.3469) 
 0.58 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 112,334 127,796 0.38 181 115,438 3,868,513 312,521 3.6723 (0.4904) 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 78,668 104,327 0.32 25 71,088 4,248,455 298,988 4.1077 (0.6055) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 - 8,473 0.01 - - 1,984,718 82,587 3.8447 (0.0669) 
                
Gumbel (0.00) 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 174,573 176,245 0.46 1,579 208,037 4,331,995 369,451 3.8447 0.0085 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 157,425 149,827 0.45 1,380 177,435 3,739,315 315,487 4.0539 0.2584 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 137,219 121,829 0.46 1,034 147,739 2,855,043 249,164 3.9694 0.3701 
 0.57 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 112,334 94,665 0.45 516 114,190 2,067,022 192,029 3.7657 0.4349 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 78,668 62,610 0.43 19 76,489 1,399,310 127,001 3.7717 0.3974 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 - NA NA NA - NA NA NA NA 
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Revenue 
Sigma 
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Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 376,230 400,000 Jul-88 96,830         
                
Frank (1.00) 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 235,089 236,817 0.52 3,321 324,103 4,671,552 439,337 3.8447 NA 
 (0.49) 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 208,815 209,896 0.50 3,039 278,949 4,586,058 403,201 3.9011 0.0379 
 (0.00) 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 174,573 175,517 0.46 1,615 208,358 4,316,328 365,310 3.7883 0.0080 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 157,425 158,329 0.43 1,118 179,201 4,318,362 348,120 4.0227 (0.0222) 
 0.39 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 137,219 142,409 0.41 858 150,164 4,176,315 328,826 3.8766 (0.0472) 
 0.58 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 112,334 119,554 0.38 456 116,299 3,812,261 292,882 3.6723 (0.1066) 
 0.79 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 78,668 91,431 0.31 111 76,648 4,011,577 265,394 4.1077 (0.1640) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 387,166 400,000 Jan-90 - 2,631 (0.11) - - 1,296,088 48,286 3.8174 (0.0281) 
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Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
134,873         
                
Normal (1.00) 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
215,193 214,904 0.49 12 281,533 4,651,687 420,633 4.1919 NA 
 (0.50) 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
189,915 189,139 0.45 31 224,922 4,776,734 399,858 4.4016 0.0392 
 - 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
156,498 157,214 0.41 - 169,458 4,618,489 363,170 4.4057 0.0100 
 0.20 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
139,615 139,909 0.39 - 143,767 4,387,072 336,182 4.3948 (0.0032) 
 0.40 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
119,634 121,171 0.38 - 119,196 3,976,642 297,416 4.2662 0.0122 
 0.60 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
94,960 96,148 0.34 - 87,008 3,695,665 253,483 4.5682 0.0476 
 0.80 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
61,665 61,572 0.31 - 49,763 2,467,007 171,247 4.2016 0.0953 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
- - NA - - - - 4.3007 - 
                
Clayton (1.00) 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
215,193 213,568 0.49 4 280,080 4,621,662 420,383 4.1660 NA 
 (0.47) 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
189,915 184,295 0.45 5 224,091 4,629,393 387,930 4.2768 0.4857 
 (0.00) 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
156,498 156,013 0.41 - 167,917 4,507,143 360,440 4.3848 0.0059 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
139,615 141,900 0.39 - 139,890 4,544,820 343,996 4.3647 (0.1754) 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
119,634 128,969 0.37 - 112,680 4,466,777 329,948 4.3556 (0.3437) 
 0.57 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
94,960 111,409 0.34 - 79,664 4,024,951 306,666 4.1299 (0.4733) 
 0.77 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
61,665 88,275 0.28 - 39,214 4,294,013 288,771 4.4415 (0.6054) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
- 5,014 (0.05) - - 1,737,716 66,170 4.1660 (0.0757) 
                
Gumbel (0.00) 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
156,498 154,623 0.42 - 167,720 4,304,801 352,923 4.1660 0.0155 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
139,615 130,489 0.41 - 139,659 3,606,842 297,610 4.3476 0.2720 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
119,634 104,675 0.40 - 109,157 2,873,184 240,675 4.1253 0.3669 
 0.58 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul- 94,960 75,792 0.39 - 79,045 2,009,565 172,704 4.2516 0.4330 
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90 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
61,665 45,756 0.35 - 43,610 1,307,728 109,378 4.1322 0.4011 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
- NA NA - - NA NA NA NA 
                
                
Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St. Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0 376,230 400,000 Jul-
88 
96,830         
                
Frank (1.00) 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
215,193 213,566 0.49 - 280,075 4,618,754 420,339 4.1660 NA 
 (0.48) 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
189,915 191,588 0.46 11 235,689 4,687,039 398,020 4.2768 0.0434 
 (0.00) 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
156,498 156,013 0.41 - 167,917 4,507,143 360,440 4.3848 0.0059 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
139,615 138,723 0.39 - 138,458 4,456,067 337,554 4.3647 (0.0251) 
 0.39 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
119,634 121,541 0.37 - 112,773 4,311,206 310,440 4.3556 (0.0524) 
 0.59 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
94,960 101,407 0.33 - 80,498 4,017,145 285,870 4.1299 (0.1160) 
 0.79 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
61,665 74,302 0.26 - 45,979 4,072,942 251,399 4.4415 (0.1722) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 344,813 400,000 Jul-
90 
- 1,436 (0.19) - - 1,052,029 35,320 4.2829 (0.0340) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copula Rho Sigma 
Revenue 
Sigma 
Costs 
Revenue Cost Date Calculated 
Value 
Simulated 
Values 
Sharpe Median Q3 Maximum St.Dev Skew 
Revenues 
Exceedance 
Benaroch - 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 65,300         
                
Normal (1.00) 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 130,551 129,430 0.41 - 140,123 3,571,430 295,904 4.6920 NA 
 (0.50) 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 110,872 109,822 0.37 - 99,079 3,484,042 276,088 4.7761 0.0224 
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 - 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 84,941 85,877 0.31 - 56,360 3,515,457 248,596 4.9851 (0.0036) 
 0.20 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 72,008 72,323 0.30 - 41,798 3,016,394 214,470 4.6276 0.0078 
 0.40 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 56,995 57,312 0.26 - 21,695 2,768,367 188,012 4.8398 (0.0075) 
 0.60 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 39,196 38,567 0.22 - 3,011 2,133,500 139,939 4.6277 0.0535 
 0.80 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 17,684 17,526 0.12 - - 1,418,212 79,988 5.1215 0.1054 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 - -  - - - - 4.8956 - 
                
Clayton (1.00) 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 130,551 130,268 0.41 - 140,729 3,728,226 301,540 4.9910 NA 
 (0.47) 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 110,872 105,802 0.37 - 99,210 3,395,827 264,178 4.7189 0.4681 
 (0.00) 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 84,941 85,804 0.32 - 57,235 3,389,612 244,404 4.8399 (0.0088) 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 72,008 75,063 0.29 - 36,387 3,406,915 233,284 5.0048 (0.1717) 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 56,995 64,638 0.27 - 16,224 3,042,987 212,940 4.5000 (0.3282) 
 0.57 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 39,196 52,134 0.22 - 420 3,082,620 199,874 4.8351 (0.4648) 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 17,684 36,607 0.16 - - 3,026,351 178,564 4.8207 (0.6005) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 - 1,721 (0.23) - - 780,353 27,448 4.9910 (0.0976) 
                
Gumbel (0.00) 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 84,941 84,995 0.31 - 56,699 3,439,386 244,546 4.9910 0.0070 
 0.19 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 72,008 66,350 0.30 - 35,398 2,764,857 196,279 4.9260 0.2778 
 0.38 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 56,995 46,752 0.27 - 15,656 2,006,341 144,233 4.8326 0.3825 
 0.57 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 39,196 28,218 0.21 - 532 1,356,205 94,902 4.7597 0.4429 
 0.78 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 17,684 11,132 0.07 - - 697,865 45,810 4.5348 0.4104 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 - NA NA - - NA NA NA NA 
                
Frank (1.00) 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 130,551 130,269 0.41 - 140,768 3,725,907 301,506 4.9910 NA 
 (0.49) 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 110,872 111,249 0.38 - 107,572 3,441,831 272,240 4.7189 0.0529 
 (0.00) 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 84,941 85,804 0.32 - 57,235 3,389,612 244,404 4.8399 (0.0088) 
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 0.19 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 72,008 72,792 0.29 - 36,604 3,334,460 226,318 5.0048 (0.0161) 
 0.39 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 56,995 59,754 0.26 - 19,442 2,913,735 198,605 4.5000 (0.0538) 
 0.59 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 39,196 45,055 0.20 - 2,011 2,985,191 182,051 4.8351 (0.1121) 
 0.79 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 17,684 27,606 0.13 - - 2,684,290 149,506 4.8207 (0.1860) 
 1.00 0.5 0.5 223,295 400,000 Jan-91 - 244 (1.03) - - 236,377 7,514 4.8618 (0.0450) 
 
 
